TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF THE
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INTRODUCrION

The law provides numerous organizational forms for the small
firm-partnership, limited partnership, corporation, statutory
close corporation, limited liability company, and others. Further,
the law permits the small business enterprise to tailor most governance rules to suit its particular needs. For example, although the
Uniform Partnership Act instructs partners to make broad policy
decisions by unanimous consent, it also permits the partnership
agreement to provide that all decisions will be made by majority
vote.1 Similarly, although the rule for statutory close corporations
is that decisions are made by majority vote, the articles of incorporation may require unanimous consent.'
* Associate Professor, Tulane Law School. Many thanks to Lynne Dallas, Kate
Federle, Bob Hillman, Larry Mitchell, and Tom Carbonneau for their very helpful
comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to William T. Hearne and Lawrence E. Marino, Class of 1994, for their tireless and diligent research assistance.
I The Uniform Partnership Act provides that, unless otherwise agreed, "ordinary
matters connected with the partnership business" are to be decided by majority vote,
but that an "act... in contravention of any agreement between the partners" requires
unanimous consent. UNi. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 213-14 (1914) [hereinafter UPA 1914]. Although this provision is silent about matters that are neither "ordinary" nor "in contravention" of a specific provision in a partnership agreement, it is
generally agreed that all matters that are not "ordinary" require unanimous consent.
See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, The DissatisfiedParticipantin the Solvent Business Venture: A
Considerationof the Relative Permanenceof Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 61-75 (1982). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act retains this rule, and
makes it explicit. Section 401(j) of the Revised Act provides:
A difference arising as to a matter in the ordinary course of business of
a partnership may be decided by a majority of the partners. An act
outside the ordinary course of business of a partnership and an amendment to the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the
consent of all the partners.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 401(j), 6 U.L.A. 226 (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter UPA 1992].
The partners may opt out of this provision. Id. § 103(a).
2 Many states' business corporation laws now contain special provisions for "close
corporations"-a term usually defined in the statute as a corporation that has a limited number of shareholders and that expressly adopts close corporation status in its
articles of incorporation. Some states intersperse such provisions throughout the
business corporation statute, see, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 158 (West 1990), while
others group close corporation provisions together at the end of the ordinary business corporation statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 342-356 (1991); MODEL
STATrORY CLOSE CORP. Supp. § 3 (1985 & Supp. 1991), in 4 MODEL BuSINESS CoRP.
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Such regulatory flexibility is not bad in itself. The statutory
framework, however, fails to provide any coherent rationale for the
application of these contradistinctive default rules.3 Both the partnership and the statutory close corporation are designed for small,
intimate business enterprises. Why, then, does the partnership
have a unanimous consent rule while the statutory close corporation has a majority vote rule? The lawyer whose small-business clients ask her this question is usually stumped for an answer. "It
doesn't matter," she assures her clients, "you can choose whichever
decisionmaking rule you want, no matter which organizational
form your company takes." Then, the clients want to be advised as
to which rule of decision to adopt. The lawyer is stumped again.
"That is a business decision, not a legal one," she finally announces, "you'll have to decide for yourselves."
The reality is that the confusing state of the law reflects our
failure to understand the internal dynamics of the small firm. We
don't know which rule of decision would be best because we lack
an organizing theoretical construct of such entities. We have been
content to let theories of the large, publicly-traded corporation
govern our thinking about closely-held firms. That is a mistake.4
ACT ANN. (1985 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 4 MBCAA]. Some states have complete,
separate statutes for statutory close corporations. See, e.g., MD. CoRps. & ASS'NS CODE
ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 (1993).
In general, no special voting requirement exists for action to be considered valid
in a close corporation. Accordingly, the rule for ordinary corporations-majority
vote-applies to close corporations as well. Moreover, even where a separate close
corporation statute exists, the decision-making rule is affirmatively stated to be majority vote. See, e.g., MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-303(5) (1993).

3 Criticism of the disjointed nature of small-business regulation, of course, is not
new. See, e.g., Harry J. Haynsworth, The Need for a Unified Small Business Legal Structure,
33 Bus. LAw. 849, 860 (1978) (endorsing the idea of an organizational form "which
would combine the best features of both partnership and corporate law in a new type
of enabling statute that would replace the existing business organization statutes as far
as small companies are concerned"). Professor Haynsworth based this suggestion on
the initial premise that "most small businesses consist of a few participants, most or all
of whom are active in the business." Id. at 854. This premise may not be true, however. See Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability and Externalization of Risk: A Comment on
the Death of Partnership,70 WASH. U. L.Q. 477, 485 (1992) ("Closely held firms are
diverse and include those firms in which all owners are active, most owners are active,
some owners are active, no owners are active, some owners are active some of the
time, and so on.").
4 It is most notably the advocates of the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm who
maintain that every firm, whether closely held or publicly traded, is best understood
as a nexus of contractual relationships. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 228-52 (1991); Charles R.

O'Kelley, Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87
Nw. U. L. REv. 216 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulationof Limited Liability and the
Death of Partnership,70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992). The application of this single analy-
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The nexus-of-contracts and institutional6 theories of the firm tell
us about large, impersonal businesses in which the interests of
shareholders and managers are, for the most part, in conflict.
These theories do not tell us about small businesses, however,
where the relationships among owners and managers are highly
personal, and owners' and managers' interests are, for the most
part, shared in common.
Accordingly, for reasons of theory and practice, this Article
challenges the existing approach to small business enterprises. I
propose a new conceptualization of "the firm" that takes into account the entire gamut of business enterprises-small as well as
large, closely held as well as publicly traded, and, significantly,
those marked by personal relationships among owners and managers as well as those in which such relationships are impersonal. The
new theory that I propose, in encapsulated form, is as follows:
Business enterprises can be said to fall along a spectrum, at one
end of which are firms that I call unitay enterprises, and at the other
end of which are adversay enterprises. The nature of the relationship among owners and managers distinguishes these two extremes. In the unitary enterprise, the relationships are personaland
are characterized by commonality of interests. In the adversary enterprise, the owner/manager relationships are impersonal and characterized by divergent or conflicting interests. Moreover, in the unitary
enterprise, owners and managers interact with each other out of
selfinterest, broadly conceived, whereas in the adversary enterprise
owners and managers act out of narrow, "selfish" self-interest.
No actual business enterprise, of course, would fall at either
the unitary or the adversary extreme. That is because every enterprise has some mixture of unitary and adversary characteristics. So,
for example, the classic close corporation, with only a handful of
owners all of whom are active in management, would fall toward
the unitary end of the spectrum. The owners work together on a
daily basis, share the firm's profits according to some mutually
agreed-upon formula, and their main goal is to establish and maintain their firm's viability. Commonality of interests predominates
in such a relationship. Nevertheless, there will be some issues as to
which the owner-managers' interests conflict-as for example,
when one owner-manager confects a transaction with the corporasis to all types of firms, without addressing the distinctions among different types of
firms, has been sharply criticized. See Hillman, supra note 3, at 479.
5 See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 38-62 and accompanying text.
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tion, or when one faction wants to expand the business and hire
more employees while the other does not. As long as such divisive
issues are relatively few and far between, and occur against a backdrop of commonly shared interests, the firm would be considered
"unitary" (that is, falling on the unitary side of the spectrum).
However, when the owners' and managers' interests conflict, not
just over isolated issues but in a generalized and sustained fashion,
then the firm would be said to fall toward the adversary end of the
spectrum. Most obviously, a sustained conflict of interests emerges
when ownership becomes separated from control, as in a large,
publicly-traded corporation. The important point is that, in judging whether a firm falls toward the unitary or the adversary end of
the spectrum, the key question is whether commonality of interests
or conflicting interests predominate in the relationship among owners and managers.
Thus, unitary and adversary enterprises are not distinguished
strictly according to their size. A large, publicly-traded corporation
would fall toward the unitary end of the spectrum if the relationship between owners and managers were personal and marked by
commonality of interests. For example, as institutional investors
become progressively more dominant in the stock market, we may
begin to see ongoing, personal relationships develop among fund
managers and corporate managers, pushing the latters' corporations toward the unitary end.7 Similarly, a small company with very
few owners and managers would be considered an adversary enterprise (that is, falling on the adversary side of the spectrum) if the
relationship between owners and managers were largely impersonal and dominated by divergent interests. For example, real estate syndications sold to a limited number of passive investors in
compliance with federal securities regulations would be considered
adversary enterprises, even though they are also, obviously, small
business enterprises.
This reconceptualization of business enterprises is extrapolated from Mansbridge's Beyond Adversary Democracy.' In that work,
Mansbridge plots democratic polities along a spectrum running
from "unitary democracies" (in which commonality of interests
predominate among the citizens) to "adversary democracies" (in
which the citizens' interests are predominately in conflict). To be
sure, the process of transposing the idea of a unitary-to-adversary
spectrum from the political context to the context of business en7 I am indebted to Professor Marleen O'Connor for this insight.
8 JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1983).
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terprises has entailed making some adjustments to the theory and
its practical application. Nevertheless, I have adopted Mansbridge's central insight about how people coordinate their behavior in joint endeavors and, because I intend to ally my
understanding of the business enterprise with her insights, I have
retained her usage of the terms "unitary" and "adversary."
At the same time, I hasten to clarify the meaning of the term
"adversary" as used in this Article. Some lawyers (perhaps, especially, some litigators) might envision an "adversary" as the opposing side in a lawsuit, where one of the antagonists must win and the
other must lose. As I use the term in this Article, however, "adversary" does not mean "enemy." An adversarial relationship, moreover, is not a competition to win in a zero-sum game. Rather,
"adversaries" are simply those whose interests diverge. In a simple
sale transaction, for example, the buyer and seller have divergent
interests to the extent that the buyer wants high quality and low
price, while the seller wants a high price and no warranties. This
conflict does not make them enemies; they still share a common
goal, namely the purchase and sale of the product. But because
their interests conflict, they are neither teammates, nor colleagues,
nor co-partners. They are, rather, adversaries sitting across the table from each other. Of course, notwithstanding their divergent
interests, they will certainly cooperate to the extent of negotiating
a deal. In the negotiation, however, each side will act to promote
his or her own narrow self-interest and will fully expect the other to
do likewise. It is precisely this sort of adversarial negotiation that is
commonly thought to produce mutual gain through trade.'
The central insight that I have adopted from Mansbridge, and
which underlies the theory I am advancing here, is that while adversarial negotiation-bargaining cooperatively, but from narrow
self-interest-takes place in circumstances of conflicting interests
(such as the sale transaction described above), in the context of a
personalized business relationship where common interests
predominate, adversarial negotiation is not the normal mode of
behavior. Rather, business associates who think of themselves as
partners, or teammates, or co-venturers, or colleagues (I use these
terms interchangeably) strive to reach consensus when they make
decisions instead of bargaining with each other from narrow selfinterest. I thus reject the paradigm of the business enterprise participant whose "rational self-interest" always leads him to act exclusively to promote his own personal welfare. At the same time, I
9 See generally R.H. CoASE, THE FiRM,

THE MARKET, AND THE LAw

(1988).
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accept the notion that businesspeople of all stripes normally act to
promote what they view as their best interests. I also assert, however,
that their sense of where their best interests lie expands in the context of a personal business relationship and contracts in the context
of an impersonal relationship.
Suppose, for example, that a close corporation with a handful
of owners who are all active in management is presented with a
business opportunity that presents significant risks and would be
costly in the short term, but might pay off very well in the long run.
How do the owner-managers go about deciding whether or not to
exploit the opportunity? Ordinarily, we expect them to assess its
benefits, costs and risks by talking it over, and to accept it if they
agree it would be good for the corporation. That much seems intuitively obvious. A closer look at this teamwork approach, however, shows that it is at odds with normal economic assumptions.
Economic assumptions posit that individuals act to further their own
welfare. On that view, we would expect the corporation's principals to calculate separately, first and foremost, the impact of the
new opportunity on their own personal welfare and then to bargain, as against their co-partners, for the decision that would best
promote their own personal welfare. Yet, to the contrary, we confidently predict that these owner-managers' first consideration would
be the enterprise's welfare, not their own. It thus appears that
owner-managers are not "rationally self-interested," at least not in
the same way that the buyer and seller mentioned earlier are.
Must these owner-managers therefore be considered to be irrational, self-sacrificing altruists? Of course not. They are, rather,
acting out of an expansive, broadly-conceived self-interest rather
than a narrow, selfish self-interest. One of the difficulties with challenging the paradigm of "economic man" as a rationally self-interested creature is the common assumption that, if one is not a selfinterested person, then one must be a self-sacrificingperson.1 ° The
notion, however, that one must be either narrowly self-interested or
altruistically self-sacrificing is a false dichotomy. It is false because
10 See, e.g., ALTRUISM, MoRALrry, AND ECONOMIc THEORY (Edmund S. Phelps, ed.
1978) (challenging the rational-self-interest model of economic theory by examining
exclusively instances of impersonal self-sacrifice). The first chapter, which is about
blood donations, describes this impersonal self-sacrifice in the sense that the donor
doesn't know, and has no reason to want to know, anything about the recipient. It is
also a completely self-referential act: if the donor thinks about the recipient at all, not
knowing anything about the actual recipient, he can only think about someone he
constructs out of his own imagination. The other chapters in the book examine
other, similarly impersonal, kinds of self-sacrifice: corporate responsibility; samaritanism; charity; and philanthropy.
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altruistic self-sacrifice is by no means the only alternative to narrow
self-interest. There are many other alternatives. Instead of being
self-interested or self-sacrificing, an individual might be other-regarding, for example, or patriotic,or committed to a religiousfaith, or envious." The self-interest/self-sacrifice dichotomy is also a deceptive
rhetorical device because it lumps together, under the single head12
ing of "altruism," all motivations other than rational self-interest.
This makes it difficult to challenge the presumption of narrow selfinterest because, however implausible a creature "economic man"
might seem to be, his saintly counterpart, the "selfless altruist,"
seems even less believable."3
Moreover, for purposes of examining and understanding the
interactions of owners and managers of business enterprises, the
self-interest/self-sacrifice dichotomy is particularly inapt. This is
because it keeps our focus squarely on the self, whereas our focus
ought to be on the nature of the interactionbetween se/fand other.
In asking whether one has behaved selfishly or selflessly, we are asking whether one has enlarged or diminished oneself In effect, such
an inquiry concentrates all of our attention on just one person at a
time, and examines his motivations as if they were isolated, as if
they arose in a vacuum. The business enterprise, however, is ajoint
endeavor, and its participants' actions do not arise in a vacuum.
Rather, the participants act and react specifically in relation to
each other. Accordingly, in this Article, although I reject the notion that corporate actors are always in pursuit of their own narrow
self-interest, I do not address the possibility that corporate actors
might be altruistic. Instead of looking at selfishness versus selflessness, I focus on the interests of owners and managers of business
11 See, e.g., BEYOND SELF-INTEREST (Jane J. Mansbridge, ed. 1990). See also AmrrAi
ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988).

12 The self-interest/self-sacrifice dichotomy is also evident in the debate over
whether the corporation, viewed as an entity, should singlemindedly seek profits, on
the one hand, or should (or may) also engage in philanthropic behavior, on the
other hand. See, e.g., James B. White, How Should We Talk About Corporations?The Languages of Economics and Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 (1985) (declaring that corporate
altruism is a moral imperative); Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate
Altruism: An IndividualisticModel 59 VA. L. Ruv. 708 (1973) (reasoning that corporate
altruism is actually the long-run form of self-interested behavior).
13 It is perhaps because anyone claiming to act "altruistically" tends to be viewed
with deep suspicion (there are, after all, a lot more jimmy Swaggarts in the world than
Mother Theresas) that some are inclined to view "altruism" as merely a disguised form
of self-interest. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST,
supra note 11, at 51 (suggesting that it might be a norm of honesty that sustains the
game strategy of "tit-for-tat" cooperation, but on the other hand it might just be longterm self-interest).
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enterprises, on expansive self-interest versus narrow self-interest,
and on sharing common interests versus having conflicting
interests.
"Narrow" or "selfish" self-interest, as used in this Article, refers
simply to an individual's interest in receiving some direct, material,
personal benefit. To return to the simple sale transaction referred
to earlier, the buyer acts out of narrow self-interest in bargaining
for the lowest price and highest quality she can get, while the seller
acts out of narrow self-interest in bargaining for high price and no
warranties. By "expansive" or "broadly-conceived" self-interest, on
the other hand, I mean an individual's interest in promoting multiple goals, namely: (1) her own direct, material welfare, (2) her ideals or moral principles, (3) someone else's welfare, and (4) the
welfare of her enterprise as a whole. Even when some of these
goals are mutually inconsistent, I maintain they are nonetheless included in the individual's calculus of where her best interests lie.
It is obvious that a businessperson has an interest in her own
material welfare. It should also be relatively easy to see that she has
an interest in vindicating her ideals or moral principles, even when
doing so would reduce her material welfare. For example, a proprietor might provide health benefits to her employees because
she believes it is the right thing to do, even though she would
pocket greater profits if she refused to offer such coverage.1 4 It is

less clear (although I would think, certainly, imaginable) that a
businessperson can have an interest in promoting the welfare of
her company as an entity. Consider again the close corporation
hypothesized earlier, which has been offered a business opportunity. One of the first questions the principals are likely to ask
themselves is, "Can we afford it?" The principals obviously do not
intend to pay for the opportunity out of their own pockets, or to
bear the risks of the opportunity personally.' 5 What they really
14 Even if dropping the employees' health benefits resulted in some loss of productivity (some good workers might leave for jobs with benefits, the morale of others
would be lowered), the proprietor's profits would still be greater if the savings from
not paying health insurance premiums exceeded the costs in productivity loss.
I do not deny that at some point the health insurance premiums might eat so
deeply into profits that the proprietor would drop her employees' health coverage.
That does not change the fact that she may be providing the coverage in the first
place, even though doing so reduces her material welfare, out of adherence to a
moral principle.
15 The principals do take on a personal "opportunity cost": by taking the risky
opportunity they forego the possibility of profiting from some other venture. Note
that they forego only the possibility of profit. The principals, however, are not personally liable for the actual expenditures necessary to exploit the opportunity.
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mean is, "Can our corporationafford it?" They phrase the question
as whether "we" can afford it, however, because they see their own
interests as including their company's welfare. This is a very different phenomenon from the autocrat who cannot distinguish his
company from his own personality. The principals of this hypothetical close corporation do not suffer from the delusion that
"l'tat c'est moi." Their attitude is, rather, best described as a form
of patriotism.16 Love of country can prompt us to support policies
whether or not they benefit us directly. In a similar fashion, a businessperson may include his company's welfare as a part of what
constitutes his own interests.
The possibility that a person might have an "interest" in promoting someone else's welfare is less obvious. Nevertheless, I
maintain here that when one person, through empathy, adopts another's good as her own, then (and to that extent) it is in her interest to promote the other's good. I maintain, moreover, that
business relationships can give rise to this sort of empathic response, and that it is likely to occur in business relationships that
are ongoing, personal, and basically collegial. I hasten to add that
by "empathy" and "collegiality" I mean something very different
from sloppy sentimentalism. By collegiality I mean a team mentality-an operating assumption that one is "on the same side" as
one's colleagues. Empathy, as I use the term here, refers simply to
the ability to see an issue from another's perspective. It is important to emphasize that empathy and collegiality do not entail selfabnegation. Indeed, these concepts do not revolve around "the
self" at all, but rather describe a particular type of interaction between self and other. Obviously, business associates do not always
and invariably adopt each other's good as their own good. Still,
adopting one's partner's good as one's own, through empathy, can
hardly be considered unusual among business associates who,
working together over a period of time, come to know, understand,
trust, and even like each other.
Thus, I contend that a person's sense of her own "interests" is
not static. Rather, self-interest has an elastic quality, expanding in
long-term personal relationships and contracting in discrete impersonal transactions. This elasticity of self-interest helps explain why
"commonality of interests" tends to predominate in enterprises
where owners and managers maintain a personal relationship. In
such enterprises, the participants have an expansive sense of their
self-interest, which makes it easy for them to discover their com16 See MANSBRIDGE,

supra note 10, at 8.
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mon interests.
They may share a common interest by virtue of their mutual
attitude of loyalty to their firm. For example, the owner-managers
of a close corporation might approach a decision whether to exploit a new business opportunity with the common understanding
that their company's profitability and stature in the community are
the primary considerations. By including the firm's welfare in their
expansive notion of where their own interests lie, they generate
commonality of interests among themselves. Alternatively, they
might share a common interest by virtue of including one another's welfare in their self-interest calculus. For example, when
one owner-manager asks the others for approval to hire an assistant, they might approach that decision with the common understanding that their colleague should not be consistently
overworked. In this way, their inclusion of their colleague's need
in their sense of their own interests again generates commonality
of interests. Moreover, there is a snowballing effect to the way a
broad conception of self-interest generates commonality of interests. The more the participants in an enterprise see themselves as
sharing common interests, the more they see their own self-interest
in broad-gauged, inclusive terms, which then generates commonlyheld interests anew, and so on.
I do not view the theory of the firm that I offer here as a specifically feminist theory. I acknowledge, however, that my approach
reflects feminist thinking at both a substantive and a methodological level. Substantively, I am perfectly comfortable recognizing the
existence of empathy, collegiality, and group loyalty in business enterprises. I am also more interested in examining the interaction
between enterprise participants than in examining the selfishness
or selflessness of participants, taken in isolation. In this, I take my
cue from feminist literature that identifies "relatedness" as an essential aspect of the human experience, 1 8 and that affirms the
value of studying the phenomenon of "other-regarding" behav17 Cf J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 51
(1977) ("[I n the closely-held firm, each member voting in his perceived self-interest
will select the course of action preferred by the other members since all have common interests.... Typically, such firms are founded by individuals who have a virtually
complete identity of interests and strong feelings of trust and confidence for one
another.").
18 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982); JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF
WOMEN (1976); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL
EDUCATION (1984); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
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ior.1 9 I recognize that some readers may believe that, because such
issues are examined by feminist scholars, they must be exclusively
the concerns of women. Indeed, even some feminists sometimes
seem to suggest that having concern for the welfare of others, or
incorporating another's welfare into one's own sense of self-interest, is something that only women do.20 I reject those gender stereotypes.2 1 I maintain that empathy and collegiality-as I have
defined those terms here-are important and intriguing aspects of
the ways that owners and managers of business enterprises
(whether male or female) relate to each other. Those who may
feel uncomfortable acknowledging these aspects of business life
may, for that reason, be uncomfortable with my description of the
"unitary enterprise."
In addition, this Article's approach is influenced by the feminist methodology of story-telling. I use the story of Helpline, Inc.
as a means of developing my concept of the unitary enterprise. A
central part of my concept is that the quality of the relationship
among an enterprise's owners and managers deeply influences
whether, and to what extent, they will act out of narrow self-interest
or will include the firm's and each other's welfare in their sense of
where their own interests lie. Stories give us a rich and concrete
picture of the owner/manager relationship, and of self-interested
as well as other-directed behaviors, that we cannot get from abstract statistical or survey data. To be sure, statistical and survey
data are useful in their own way, and we need such empirical research in order to begin building a meaningful body of knowledge
19 See, e.g., Nancy J. Chodorow, Toward a Relational Individualism: The Mediation of
Self Through Psychoanalysis,in RECONSTRUCTING INDMVDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 197 (Thomas C. Heller et al. eds., 1986);
Carol Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of the Self in Relationship, in id.
at 237.
20 For a discussion and debate about the problems of male-female sameness and
difference, see Karen Gross, Foreword: She's My Lawyer and She's a Woman, 35 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 293 (1990); see also Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference
Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and CriticalRace Theory, 1991
DuKE LJ. 296.
21 See Jeanne Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the
Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REv. 109 (1991). I am sympathetic to Professor
Schroeder's warning that women should be extremely wary of using stereotypes because stereotypes usually end up doing women more harm than good. I confess, however, that I see a significant difference between the feminist brand of gender
stereotyping and misogynist stereotyping. The misogynist uses the stereotype of the
nurturing mother to exclude women from other activities. The feminist uses the
same stereotype to celebrate and raise the status of nurturing. See, e.g., MILLER, supra
note 18.
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about small businesses. 22 Statistical and survey information, how-

ever, cannot provide detailed accounts of the dynamics of ownermanager interactions. For that sort of knowledge, we need to lis-

ten to stories of actual firms. The story of Helpline will, I hope,
permit us to engage in a concrete, detailed exploration of how one
unitary enterprise actually operated.2
This Article's proposal that business enterprises generally can
be seen as running along a unitary-to-adversary spectrum is not intended to supplant either the nexus of contracts or the institutional theory of the firm. I do argue that, inasmuch as both of
these theories describe adversary enterprises, in which conflicting
interests predominate over shared interests, neither is wholly applicable to the unitary enterprise. At the same time, inasmuch as
there is no such thing as a purely unitary enterprise, both the contract theory and the institutional theory should come into play
whenever participants in a unitary enterprise confront an issue on
which their interests clearly diverge. In short, these theories help
us understand the adversary aspects of the unitary enterprise.
It is also my hope that the observations developed here may
shed some useful light on the institutional theory of the firm. The
proponents of this theory generally reject the claim that corporate
actors are always motivated by their own narrow self-interest. More
particularly, they assert that corporate managers are capable of selfless altruism, that in fact they regularly do act selflessly, putting the
interests of other constituencies ahead of their own selfish interest,
24
and that the law should affirmatively encourage them to do SO. I
22 Because we have so little reliable empirical data about small businesses, we run a
significant risk of falling into the trap of legislating the governance rules lobbied for
by a small number of promoters. These promoters do not necessarily reflect the
needs of most of the people affected by such governance rules. See Hillman, supra
note 3, at 485, 487.
23 It might be objected that the story of Helpline is not very useful because it is
only anecdotal, and there is no empirical evidence to show that Helpline is a typical
enterprise. I suppose Helpline cannot be called "typical" because we cannot know
what is a "typical" enterprise (if one exists, which may be doubtful) without a great
deal more empirical research. Still, the dynamics of decisionmaking at Helpline-the
mixture of rational deliberation, empathy, gut feelings, and ideology-will be perfectly familiar to any lawyer who has ever counseled small firms. Thus, whether or not
Helpline is typical, it is surely recognizable. Perhaps more importantly, the point of
storytelling is "that there are forms of knowledge that may not be generated or validated by scientific objectivity, through which we may nonetheless learn critical things
about ourselves and our world." Kathryn Abrams, Hearingthe Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L.
REv. 971, 1028 (1991). Mansbridge's richly detailed and fascinating chronicle of this
one enterprise tells us a great deal about "unitary" enterprises that we will not get
except by listening to the whole story.
24 See, e.g. William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post ContractualCorpora-
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hope that, in addition to affirming the managers' potential for selflessness, we can also examine the ways in which the unitary modes
of empathy, collegiality, and consensus-building operate in the
boardroom. In short, I hope the insights offered here can pave the
way for an examination of the unitary aspects of the "institutional"
corporation.
The Article consists, of three parts. In Part I, I describe the
existing theories of "the firm." I outline, from the perspective of
each respective theory, the defining features of the firm, the central problem of the firm, and the chief strategy used to redress or
prevent the central problem. I then argue that both theories are
designed for impersonal enterprises marked by adversarial relationships. In Part II, I sketch Mansbridge's concept of the unitary
democracy and describe in some detail the actual experience of
Helpline, Inc., the nonprofit corporation that Mansbridge studied.25 I then lay out the basic contours of the "unitary enterprise"-its defining features, its central problem, and the chief
strategy for preventing or redressing its central problem. My focus
is on the ongoing operation of the unitary enterprise-how decisions are made and how policies are set-as opposed to the
breakup of such firms. 26 In Part III, I argue that, except for parttion, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 180 (1992); William W. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A CriticalAppraisal 74 CORNELL L. Rv. 407 (1989); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The
DelawareJudiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and CorporateLaw, 68 TEX. L. REV.
865 (1990); David Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, 24 IND. L. REv. 223 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A CriticalLook at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1263 (1992);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, 71 TEX. L. REv. 217 (1992); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modem Corporation (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
25 Helpline was one of two "unitary democracies" that Mansbridge studied; the
other was a small town in Vermont, governed by the traditional town meeting.
26 The breakup of the unitary enterprise poses special problems. As will be seen,

decisions in the unitary enterprise are usually made by consensus, and the first step
toward reaching consensus is to identify where the group's common interests lie. At
the point of breakup of the enterprise, the participants' interests largely conflict. For
reasons discussed in Part II of this Article, the participants should not try to reach

consensus when their interests truly conflict, but rather, should use adversary procedures to reach a decision. But what sort of adversary procedure should they use?
Moreover, should their fiduciary duties change when they go into adversary mode?
For a critique of fiduciary duty law in close corporations, see Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. Riw.

1675 (1990).

Fi-

nally, should any participant be allowed to withdraw her capital from the firm at any
time (the partnership default rule), or should at-will withdrawal be permitted only for
the owners holding a majority stake (the corporate default rule)? This last question
has been debated for a long time, see, e.g., EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at
228-53; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 17; Hillman, supra note 1; Terry A.
O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-ManagedFirm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciay Obligationin Close Corporations,22 SETON HALL L.REv.
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nership law, the statutory regimes that exist supposedly to serve the
needs of small businesses are more incoherent than useful. I then
examine partnership law, and explore the deep resonance between
this Article's theory of the unitary enterprise and longstanding
precepts of partnership law. It is striking that, in developing their
own governance structure, Helpline's members unwittingly evolved
toward the governance rules of the Uniform Partnership Act. I argue that happened because partnership law is designed for enterprises where relationships are personal and common interests
predominate. Partnership law, thus, can be seen as embodying a
practical application of the theory of the unitary enterprise.
This Article's conception of the unitary enterprise and the adversary enterprise should be understood as an initial effort. I make
no pretense of examining all of its implications. For that reason,
the conclusion of the Article does not bring the discussion to closure. Rather, it outlines the salient questions and possibilities arising out of this new conception. Such issues must await future
treatment, based on further empirical as well as theoretical research. This Article, thus, is in the nature of a prolegomenon. It is
intended to usher in a new way of looking at the firm, and especially of looking at the small business enterprise.
I.

Two

COMPETING THEORIES OF THE

FIRM

Prevailing corporate law theories describe the firm, alternatively, as a nexus-of-contracts or as a quasi-public institution. This
Part examines such theories, and shows that both of them posit an
enterprise in which the participants' interests primarily conflict.
For that reason, economic incentives, contractual exchange, and
coalitional power struggles figure prominently in these theories'
explanations of owner/manager/stakeholder relationships. Conversely, the notions of broadly-conceived self-interest and of sharing common interests with colleagues are alien to both the
contractual and the institutional theories of the large firm. Accordingly, these theories hold very little relevance for enterprises
where the owner/manager relationships are personal and
collegial.
A.

The Nexus-of-Contracts Theory
The contract theory envisages the firm as a nexus of contracts

646 (1992). The implications for this debate of this article's conception of the closelyheld firm as a unitary enterprise are beyond the scope of this Article.
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27
entered into among rational, self-interested profit maximizers.
The firm's managers are the focal point of this nexus, contracting
bilaterally with each of the firm's various "inputs"-a term that includes shareholders as well as lenders, employees, suppliers and
other creditors. 2 Under the nexus-of-contracts theory, shareholders may be considered inputs inasmuch as they are not owners of
the firm (after all, a nexus of contracts cannot be "owned"), and
they are clearly not managers. 29 The terms of the contract between
shareholders and managers, however, sharply differentiate shareholders from creditors. Shareholders hold residual claims against
the firm's assets, while creditors hold fixed claims. As residual
claimants, shareholders are entitled to whatever, if anything, remains after provision for the payment of fixed claims has been
made."0 Thus, with respect to fixed claimants, managers obligate
the firm to pay specified wages, or a specified price for materials,
or a specified interest on borrowed money, and so forth. A bilateral, arms-length bargain is established.3" With respect to shareholders, however, managers obligate themselves to operate the
firm for the benefit of the shareholders (or, in contractarian terms,
with a view to maximizing the profits of the firm and hence the
wealth of the shareholders). An agency relationship, in which
managers are bound to subordinate their own interests to those of
32
the shareholders, is established.
The relationship between shareholders and managers being,

27 For a comprehensive elaboration of the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm,
see EASrERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4. See also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.ECON. REv. 777,
783 (1972); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv.
1259, 1261-62 (1982); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11
(1976); William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1522-24 (1982). For critiques of Easterbrook and Fischel's
nexus-of-contracts theory, see Bratton, The Economic Structureof the Post-ContractualCorporation, supra note 24, at 180-86; Bratton, The *Nexus of Contracts: Corporation, supra
note 24, at 415, 417; LymanJohnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate
Enterprise,92 COLUM. L. Rv. 2215, 2219-26 (1992) (book review); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, 71 TEX. L. REv. 217, 219-29 (1992).
28 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27, at 311. See alsoJohnson, supra note 27, at
2220-21 (citing Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27).
29 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 27, at 789 n.14; Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities,
Firm-Specific CapitalInvestments, and the Legal Treatment of FundamentalCorporateChanges,
1989 DuvE L.J. 173, 175.
30 E.g., EAsrERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 67-68; Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 290-92 (1980).
31 Mitchell, Corporate Governance, supra note 24, at 1266.
32 Jonathan R. Macey, An EconomicAnalysis of the Various Rationalesfor Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of CorporateFiduciaryDuties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 23, 24
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in essence, one of agency, the principal problem for corporate governance, according to the nexus-of-contracts theory, is that the
agent's performance will not meet the high standard expected by
the principal. Stated in contractarian terms, the principal governance problem of the firm is the problem of agency costs.33 Con-

tractarians, assuming that corporate actors act out of narrow selfinterest, define agency costs narrowly. Under the contract theory,
agency costs consist of shirking and stealing---behavior, in other
words, that not only reduces the profits of the firm, but also is motivated by the managers' desire for leisure or their desire to enrich
themselves.3 4 Other motivations, such as adherence to a principle
or belief, or compassion for others, are not recognized as influencing managerial behavior. So, for example, the possibility that a
manager might scrupulously comply with expensive environmental
regulations, although the firm could easily avoid compliance and
thereby enhance its profits, is not addressed as an agency cost in
the nexus-of-contracts literature. 5
Contractarians' description of the chief strategy for controlling agency costs is also consistent with their view that managers,
like shareholders, are narrowly self-interested. Under the contract
theory, managers' decisionmaking is constrained by market forces
that appeal to their narrow self-interests. The product market, the
market for managerial talent, and the market for corporate control
all present the corporate manager with promises of personal benefit if she works hard to maximize firm profits and shareholder
wealth, and with threats of reprisal that will affect her directly if she
does not work hard for the shareholders' benefit.3 6 These marketdriven appeals to self-interest are the primary vehicles by which
(1991). See also PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCrURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds. 1985) [hereinafter PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS].
33 John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS, supra note 32, at 2-3.
34 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27, at 308-10.
35 This view of managers as rationally self-interested profit maximizers also fuels
the debate over other-constituency statutes, which permit directors to take into account the interests of employees, bondholders, and other corporate "constituencies"
in addition to the shareholders' interests. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1715,
1716 (1993). Opponents of such statutes argue that managers will simply abuse their
broadened discretion, always serving their own interests while purporting to serve the
needs of this or that corporate constituency. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 29; Roberta
Romano, A Guide to Takeovers, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 172 (1992).
36 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The CorporateContract,89 COLUM.
L. REv. 1416, 1419-20 (1989); Fama, supra note 30, at 292-97; Oliver E. Williamson,
The Modern Corporation: Origins,Evolution, Attributes 19J. ECON. Lrr. 1537, 1556, 155960 (1981).
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agency costs are controlled. Accordingly, the law should take a
back seat to markets in keeping managers focused on shareholder
welfare. Contractarians thus take an exceedingly dim view of legal
rules that operate to impede these market forces, such as anti-takeover statutes, which interfere with the market for corporate
control.3 7
The Institutional Theoy

B.

The institutional theory of the corporation was propounded as
early as 1932 by Berle and Means, in The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.3 8 Berle and Means set out to demonstrate that in
the light of corporate law and corporate practice, which had combined to deprive shareholders of any meaningful role in management, the corporation could no longer be considered the private
property of the shareholders.3 9 After laying out a detailed and
wide-ranging argument refuting the notion that the corporation
was private property, they turned their attention, briefly, to an alternative explanation of the large firm.4 ° Their explanation was
largely predictive. At some point in the future, they suggested, the
corporation would be understood as an institution that would have
three principle characteristics. First, it would exist for the benefit
of all society, not solely the shareholders. 4 Second, the law would
eventually give managers broad latitude to set corporate policies
beneficial to other corporate constituencies even if such policies
deprived shareholders of some portion of corporate profits.4 2 Finally, the board of directors would come to be understood as a
"neutral technocracy," balancing the claims of all corporate constituents and distributing corporate wealth "on the basis of public pol43
icy rather than private cupidity."
37 ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAw

267-94 (1993).

38 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967).
39 See generally id. at 1-9, 333-57.

See id. at 352-57.
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
43 Id. Berle and Means are not ordinarily associated with this view of directors as
quasi-public servants. Indeed, Professor Berle was quite ambivalent about it. In 1931,
he argued that corporate managers hold their powers "in trust" for the benefit of the
corporation and its shareholders. Adolphe Berle, CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust,
44 HAgv. L. REV. 1145 (1932). However, when Professor Dodd suggested that corporate managers should be deemed to hold their powers in trust for the benefit of all
corporate constituencies, E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932), Berle not only agreed with Dodd as a matter of
theory, but claimed the theory of corporate social responsibility as his own. Adolphe
40
41
42
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The institutional theory of the large firm is now making a
comeback, partly in response to the hostile takeover wave of the
1980s, partly (and more fundamentally) as a response to the nexusof-contracts theory of the firm. Like Berle and Means, the new institutionists view the modem corporation as a quasi-public institution designed to allow the aggregation of large amounts of capital
to be deployed in the mass production of consumer goods." On
this view, the modem corporation forms the backbone of the national economy, providing not only consumer goods, but also jobs
at wages high enough to enable consumers to buy the goods, a
solid tax base for local communities, support for charitable and
cultural organizations, and, in addition, an investment vehicle for
shareholders, bondholders, and lending institutions. Because it
plays such a crucial role in the larger economy, the modem corporation is said to exist for the benefit of all of its constituents: shareholders, employees, suppliers, lenders, bondholders, even local
communities. The new institutionists, thus, reject the notion of
shareholder primacy, pursuant to which directors owe their loyalty
exclusively to the shareholders. Instead, they call for an expansion
of directors' duties to include all constituencies, and a concomitant
expansion of directorial discretion to act in the best interests of
nonshareholder constituencies.45 In essence, the new institutionists view the corporation, not as a nexus of bilateral contracts, but
rather as a multilateral community of stakeholder groups, each of
Berle, For Wom CorporateManagers Are Trustees, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365, 1366 (1933).
At the same time, he maintained that, as a practical matter, corporate social responsibility would have to be developed through some means other than abandoning the
directors' strict fiduciary duties to the shareholders. Id. at 1367, 1372.
44 See Berle & Means, supra note 38, at 3-7; see also Stephen M.H. Wallman, The
ProperInterpretationof CorporateConstituency Statutes and Formulationof DirectorDuties, 21
STETSON L. REv. 163, 167 (1991)(asserting that "the overall promotion of societal
wealth is the primary goal of incorporation"). For recent treatment of the debate
over the raison d'etreof the corporation, see, e.g.,Johnson, supra note 24; Millon, supra
note 24; Lewis D. Solomon, HumanisticEconomics: A New Model for the CorporateConstituency Debate, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 321 (1990); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL.J. CORP. L. 33 (1991).
45 This position is reflected in other constituency statutes, which generally permit
directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders, provided
that shareholder interests are not thereby harmed; it is also reflected in judicial decisions such as that of the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). For discussions and summaries of the
debate over other constituencies, see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, InterpretingNonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971 (1992); Johnson, supra note 24;
Millon, supra note 24; Symposium, Corporate Malaise--Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or
Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1991); Symposium, Defining The CorporateConstituency, 59
U. CN. L. REv. 319 (1990).
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which makes a vital contribution to the corporation's welfare, and

is entitled to share in its wealth.
This view of the corporation-as-institution corresponds to the
predictions made by Berle and Means.4 6 Some commentators,
however, have gone considerably further. They do not view it as
made up of competing stakeholders presided over by a neutral,
technocratic management. Rather, the emerging institutional view
is that management is just another stakeholder group competing
with shareholders, employees, lenders, and others for their share
of corporate wealth. 47 Drawing on organization theory and on
game theory, these new institutionists describe the interaction of
stakeholder groups, including management, as a struggle for dominance.4 In the course of that struggle, stakeholder groups engage
in a continuous game of forming "power coalitions," double-crossing their coalition partners, and forming new coalitions. 49 As coalitions break up and different ones take their place, the locus of
power in the firm shifts. Therefore, corporate wealth is distributed, from time to time, in accordance with the preferences of the
particular coalition that happens to be dominant.5" In addition,
because decision-making is done in the context of this fluid process of coalition formation, the corporation will not pursue a single-minded objective such as profit maximization. Instead, it will
have multiple, and often conflicting, objectives, albeit with an overarching goal of continued viability.51
In accordance with this view of the large firm as a "series of
coalitions"5 2 some institutionists view the risk of unequal bargaining power as the principal problem for corporate governance. If
all constituencies within the corporation could always protect
themselves, the problem of factional overreaching could be
avoided. The possibility always, exists, however, that one (or more)
See supra notes 3843 and accompanying text.
47 See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human CapitalEra: ReconceptualizingCorporateLaw
to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899 (1993); Mitchell,
Corporate Governance, supra note 24; John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate
Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 CEO. L.J. 1495, 1496 (1990); Lynn Dallas, Two
Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19, 19-20
(1988).
48 W. RICHARD ScoTr, ORGANIZATIONs: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND OPEN SYsTEMS 26466 (1981); Coffee, supra note 47, at 1496-97; Dallas, supra note 47, at 30-32. See also
O'Connor, supra note 47, at 49-50.
49 Dallas, supra note 47, at 31. See Coffee, supra note 47, at 1496-97, 1545-49.
50 Dallas, supra note 47, at 41-42, 80-81; see also Coffee, supra note 47, at 1545-49.
51 Coffee, supra note 47, at 1499 (employees and bondholders); Dallas, supra note
47, at 39-43, 64 n.153, 103-04.
52 Coffee, supra note 47, at 1545.
46
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stakeholder groups will be excluded from the controlling coalition.
For example, the plant may be relocated to reduce labor costs-an
instance of shareholders and managers teaming up to exclude employees; 53 or shareholders might be drawn to a hostile bid-an instance of shareholders and an outsider (the hostile bidder)
teaming up to exclude managers and employees.5 4 Of course,
whatever coalition holds power from time to time is constrained in
making decisions by the need to prevent excluded groups from
withdrawing their resources from the firm altogether, as well as by

the need to keep the power coalition itself intact.55
The chief strategy for protecting the interests of all corporate
stakeholders is for the board of directors to represent all of them.
One suggestion is that the board should consist of elected representatives of each stakeholder group, including shareholders, managers, employees, lenders, and others.56 Another suggestion is for
the board to be self-perpetuating, so that it represents no particular
stakeholder group (including senior executive officers) .57 In theory, both a fully representational board and a self-perpetuating
board would respond to the competing claims of all stakeholders.58
The self-perpetuating board would resemble both Berle and
Means' "neutral technocracy" and the mediative body envisioned
53 On the institutional view, a plant relocation amounts to a "double-cross" of the
workers because workers accept lower wages in their early years with the corporation
in return for higher wages in their later years. When the plant is relocated and the
workers are laid off, they are deprived of the higher wages they had a right to expect.
Shareholders, meanwhile, enjoy higher profits because of the reduced labor costs. See
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to ProtectDisplaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1212 (1991); Kathleen
Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State NonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 52-53 (1991).
54 Coffee, supra note 47, at 1526, 1541. While institutionists may view the shareholders' acceptance of a hostile bid as a double-cross, contractarians would view such
an act as completely appropriate, profit-maximizing behavior. See e.g., EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 26-28.
55 Dallas, supra note 47, at 92-97.
56 Id. at 107-12. Cf O'Connor, supra note 47, at 945-56 (blending the idea of
worker participation on corporate boards with the notion that the board should act as
a "neutral referee," balancing interests of all corporate stakeholders).
57 Mitchell, Corporate Governance, supra note 24.
58 See Dallas, supra note 47, at 111-12 (representational boards); O'Connor, supra
note 47, at 961-65 (same); Mitchell, CorporateGovernance,supra note 24 (self-perpetuating boards). Cf Coffee, supranote 47, at 83-85 (suggesting that the board of directors
should have discretion to recognize the legitimate claims of nonshareholder constituencies, but not suggesting that the board be representative of nonshareholder constituencies); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REv. 121,
130-36 (1991) (same); Steven M.H. Wallman, The ProperInterpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. Rv. 163 (1991)
(same).
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by other-constituency statutes, 9 but the completely representational board, while superficially similar, would be fundamentally
different. Berle and Means' neutral technocrats would have been
an elite corps beholden to no particular stockholder group. They
would have set corporate policy by first divining the best interests
of each stakeholder group and then balancing the respective
groups' interests against each other to achieve some "public
good."60 The self-perpetuating board would apparently operate in
the same way. 61 By contrast, with a representative board, the various stakeholder groups would articulate their own demands, speaking through their representatives on the board. The board would
then set corporate policy through a process of, alternately, coordinating such competing demands, and negotiating a viable compromise among competing stakeholder groups.62
C.

The Underlying Assumption: Predominately Conflicting Interests

The contract and institutional theories of the large firm are at
odds with each other over numerous important aspects of corporate governance. Their overriding difference is that contractarians
are comfortable with the reality that corporate wealth flows towards
those with the greatest bargaining power,6" while institutionists
worry about excessive concentrations of wealth and power.64 This
in turn leads them to disagree sharply over the legitimacy of redistributive government regulation of corporate arrangements.65
Other points of disagreement between contractarians and institutionists can be seen as proceeding from their divergent stances on
regulation. Thus, contractarians buttress their argument that regulation is illegitimate by depicting the corporation as a bundle of
59 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
60 BERLE & MrANs, supra note 38, at 356.
61 See Mitchell, Corporate Governance, supra note 24.
62 Dallas, supra note 47, at 110; see also O'Connor, supra note 47.
63 E.g., Macey, supra note 29, at 188-92.
64 Johnson, supranote 24, at 882 (noting that the idea that those with power must
be held accountable is a social norm that transcends and predates corporate law);
McDaniel, supra note 49, at 125 ("Anti-egalitarian wealth transfers are particularly disturbing."); Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, supranote 24, at 218-19 (noting the "potentially dangerous trend toward the concentration of corporate wealth in the hands of a
relatively small group of institutional investors").
65 Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 4, at 1-39 (suggesting that a corporate contract should be subjected to the least government regulation possible) with
O'Connor, supra note 47 (advocating that the law impose new fiduciary duties upon
directors in favor of corporate employees).
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private contracts, 66 while institutionists justify public scrutiny and
control of corporations by characterizing the enterprise as a quasipublic institution. 67 Similarly, for contractarians, government has
no business decreeing in whose interest the firm should be run
because the corporate actors' private contract dictates the purpose
of the corporation.6 8 For institutionists, on the other hand, government has every right to insist that the corporation be run for
the benefit of all society because it is so thoroughly affected with a
public interest that the community at large is entitled to have a say
in its management.69
Despite this difference over governmental regulation, and the
more particularized disagreements thereby generated, however,
contractarians and institutionists agree on a fundamental point,
namely, that conflicting interests predominate in "the firm." For
both camps, the firm is an adversarial enterprise, and its governance issues revolve around coordinating the behavior of individuals or groups whose interests are, for the most part, adverse to one
another. It is little wonder, therefore, that neither contractarians
nor institutionists explore the phenomena of empathy, collegiality,
consensus-building, or searching for commonality of interests in
the business enterprise. The contractarian view suppresses these
unitary phenomena by depicting the firm as a series of bilateral,
arms' length, adversarial contracts hammered out between narrowly self-interested individuals.7 ° The unitary aspects of business
enterprises are similarly overlooked by those institutionists who depict the firm as a series of coalitions in which constituency groups
vie for power, each calculating its narrow self-interest as it alternately enters into and withdraws from the shifting coalitions.71
Even those institutionists who reject the notion that corporate
managers acts exclusively out of self-interest nevertheless picture
the firm as an essentially adversary enterprise, in that the interests
66 E.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4 at 36-37; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 36, at 1446-48.
67 See, e.g., Wallman, supra note 58, at 167; Johnson, supra note 24, at 868-69, 876,
886 n.82 (quoting J. Meyer & J. Gustafson, Epilogue: For Whom Does the Corporation
Toil?, in THE U.S. BusINrss CORPORATION 211, 230 (. Meyer & J. Gustafson eds.
1988)). See also Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv.
1145, 1149, 1160-61 (1932).
68 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 4-6; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
36, at 1418, 1421; Fama, supra note 30, at 289; Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory
and Methodology, 58 Accr. REv. 319, 331 (1983).
69 Bratton, supra note 24, at 421; Dallas, supra note 47; Johnson, supra note 24;
Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, supra note 24, at 228-29.
70 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 4-7.
71 See Dallas, supra note 47; Coffee, supra note 47; O'Connor, supra note 47.
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of the various constituency groups are understood to be in conflict
most of the time (hence the need for a directorial body that is
capable of acting selflessly and altruistically to mediate the stakeholders' competing claims).72 Accordingly, neither the contract
theory nor the institutional theory is appropriate for the "unitary"
enterprise, where relationships are personal and, more importantly, collegial.7 3 At the same time, it should be emphasized that,
in moments when intractable conflict does erupt in such enterprises, the insights of both institutional and contract theory may be
very useful. At such times, the institutional theory teaches us a
great deal about the dynamics of shifting coalitions. Similarly,
when the interests of participants in a business enterprise are in
conflict, contract theory teaches us much about the economic incentives that lead adversaries to enter into mutually beneficial arrangements with each other.
Nevertheless, the issues that consume institutionists and contractarians are largely irrelevant to the personal, "unitary" business
enterprise. Conflict of interests is not the predominate feature of
such firms. Moreover, the risk of factional double-crossing is not
their central problem.7 4 Nor is the risk of managerial shirking and
72 See, e.g. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, supra note 24.
73 In an earlier article, I argued that while the owner-managed firm can usefully be
considered a nexus of contractual relations, the contract in the owner-managed firm
would be undergirded by assumptions and understandings quite different from those
applicable in the publicly-traded corporation. In particular, I suggested that ownermanagers' behavior is both self-interested and "other-regarding." O'Neill, supra note
26. I continue to believe that owner-managers (most of them, most of the time) cannot help being motivated by some mixture of both self-interest and concern for each
other's welfare. I have come to believe, however, that my attempt to shoehorn my
own understanding of the owner-managers' "contractual" relationship into the nexusof-contracts theory is fundamentally distortive of that theory. I am therefore abandoning that attempt. My view is incompatible with the nexus-of-contracts theory because the nexus-of-contracts posited by contractarians appears to admit of no
motivation other than narrow self-interest-whether the nexus of contracts is a publicly-traded corporation or a closely held firm. See, e.g., O'Kelley, supranote 4; EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 4.
For example, Professor O'Kelley's description of a hypothetical venture between
Susan and Emily has the two women bargaining with each other strictly at arms'
length, each one carefully calculating her own narrow self-interest. O'Kelley, supra
note 4. I do not deny that successful two-person ventures might be formed and operated on this adversarial basis. My sense, however (admittedly based on my own anecdotal experience in practice), is that two-person ventures are not usually so
adversarial. Obviously we need more empirical data on this point. In any event,
although it is enormously important to know how venturers will act when their relationship is adversarial,Professor O'Kelley's approach does not tell us how venturers will act
when their relationship is collegial.
74 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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stealing such firms' central problem. 5 Even if it were, moreover,
the market forces that control shirking and stealing-especially the
market for corporate control and the market for managerial talent-cannot be expected to operate in the unitary firm as they operate in the archetypical, large, publicly traded corporation.7 6
In sum, the nexus of contract and institutional theories address the problems of large, impersonal corporations-firms in
which shareholders, managers, and other constituencies are all adversaries of each other. In the following Part, I will explore the
concept of the unitary enterprise, and will show that these theories
of the firm do not serve the unitary enterprise well.
II.
A.

THE UNITARY ENTERPRISE

Description of the Unitary Democracy: In Principle

At the outset of Beyond Adversary Democracy, Jane Mansbridge
sketches a description of adversary and unitary democracies-two
modes of political decisionmaking that she differentiates according
to whether interests conflict or are shared in common:
The West believes that it invented democracy, and that institutions like Parliament, representation, and universal adult suffrage are synonymous with democracy itself. Every American
schoolchild knows that when you set up a democracy you elect
representatives-in school, the student council; later, senators,
representatives, councilmen, assemblymen, and aldermen.
When you do not agree, you take a vote, and the majority rules.
This combination of electoral representation, majority rule, and
one-citizen/one-vote is democracy. Because this conception of
democracy assumes that citizens' interests are in constant conflict, I have called it "adversary" democracy.
Every step in this adversary process violates another, older
understanding of democracy. In that older understanding, people who disagree do not vote; they reason together until they
agree on the best answer. Nor do they elect representatives to
reason for them. They come together with their friends to find
agreement. This democracy is consensual, based on common
interest and equal respect. It is the democracy of face-to-face
relations. Because it assumes that citizens have a single com77
mon interest, I have called it "unitary" democracy.
The unitary democracy has four essential characteristics. First, its
75 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
76 See O'Neill, supra note 26; see also CHARs R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusiNEss ASSOcIATIONS 152-53 (1992).
77 MANSBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 3.
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citizens share primarily common interests in the way I have described
earlier.7 ' They can create a common interest by making each other's
good their own, through empathy. They can also generate a common
interest by making the good of the group as a whole their own. They
may discover that they have a common interest because they share the
same ideals. Finally, their narrow self-interests may simply overlap,
giving them a common interest in pursuing the goal that will further
their respective selfish desires. 79 The notion that a common interest
can arise in each of these different ways underlies what Mansbridge
calls the "central assumption" of unitary democracy. That is, "while its
members may initially have conflicting preferences about a given issue, goodwill, mutual understanding, and rational discussion can lead
to the emergence of a common enlightened preference that is good
for everyone."80
Second, citizens of a unitary democracy share a "rough equality of
respect."8 The members of the group need not all have the same
abilities, but rather appreciate one another's distinctive abilities.
They have a "vivid sense of underlying identity-a sense that rebels
The
against the idea that either person is superior or inferior."
members' capacity to respect each other equally is rooted in their perception that they are "alike," in some way-perhaps because of a
shared past or a shared cultural heritage.8 "
Third, in a unitary democracy, decisions are usually made by consensus, which is "a form of decision making in which, after discussion,
one or more members of the assembly sum up prevailing sentiment,
and if no objections are voiced, this becomes agreed-on policy."84
This form of decisionmaking is not the same as simply requiring a
unanimous vote. The consensus is arrived at after discussion. It is in
the process of the citizens' discussion-of talking over the issue, of
articulating their perceptions, understandings, and preferences, that
they work their way toward finding common ground. The discovery of
where their common interests lie, in turn, permits them to forge a
consensus on the issue. 85
Significantly, consensus is not always the appropriate rule of deci78 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the elastic nature of self
interest).
79 MANSBRIDGE,
80 Id. at 25.
81
82
83
84
85

supra note 8, at 27.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 32.
See id. at 27-28, 255.
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sion in the unitary democracy. If, after discussion, the group cannot
reach common ground-that is, if in the discussion it becomes clear
that the citizens' interests fundamentally conflict-then insisting on
arriving at consensus is counterproductive. It will result either in the
majority faction putting extreme social pressure on the minority to go
along (which results in a coerced, and thus false, consensus), or in
maintenance of the status quo-to the detriment of at least one faction, and sometimes to the detriment of everyone. Mansbridge recommends, therefore, that when interests conflict, the unitary
democracy should not try to reach consensus, but should switch to
adversary decisionmaking procedures. The factions should, in other
words, negotiate at arms' length. They might negotiate with a view to
distributing benefits proportionally, or with a view to taking turns
(i.e., one faction's interests are served this time, with the other having
its way the next time), or with a view to having those who benefit from
a particular decision compensate those who suffer some detriment.
Another adversarial procedure is, simply, to make the decision by majority vote.8 6
Finally, the citizens of a unitary democracy deal with each other
face to face. This is important because direct communication facilitates the group's ability to reason together, to empathize with each
other, to discover where their common interests lie, and to arrive at a
decision that all can accept.8 7 As with consensus, however, face-to-face
meetings may be counterproductive when interests conflict. The fear
of conflict often leads people to avoid it if they can. Accordingly,
when a meeting is likely to be conflictive, some will not attend it at all,
so their preferences are not articulated or heard."8 Others may attend
but "hold back what they have to say until they lose control and become too angry to listen." 9 Leaders of the group may try to suppress
the difficult issue altogether, or they may press hard for unanimity, in
which case the ultimate decision will not truly reflect a common
interest. 90
For these reasons, a unitary group should meet and deliberate in
person as long as common interests predominate over conflicts.
When a divisive issue arises, however, the group might use some other
means of communicating about the nature of the issue and the members' respective preferences.9" The group might vote by secret ballot,
86

87

See id. at 32-33, 265-66.
Id. at 10, 33.

88 Id.

89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.

at 34.
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for example, or representatives of the various factions might be
elected to work out a negotiated agreement.9 2 Either such arrangement defuses the intense emotions that can accompany conflict. Not
only does that make the process of decisionmaking less stressful on
the individual members, but it also makes it easier for them to reunite
later on other, nondivisive issues.
B.

Decisionmaking in a Unitary Enterprise: Helpline, Inc.

This section examines the decisionmaking processes at
Helpline, Inc., the nonprofit corporation described in Beyond Adversary Democracy. At the outset, I emphasize that I am not holding
out this organization as somehow typical of small businesses. I recognize that it differs from our usual conception of a small business,
in that it was a not-for-profit organization, a significant minority of
its resources went into promoting a New Left political agenda
(although the bulk of Helpline's operation consisted of delivering
social services to troubled adolescents), and, with 41 voting members all actively involved in management, Helpline was larger than
what we normally think of as a small business. Do these atypical
attributes make Helpline's decisionmaking processes irrelevant to
corporate lawyers? An argument might be made that such is the
case. Stated bluntly, the argument would proceed roughly as follows: (1) Helpline's members were not businesspeople but rather
political and social activists; (2) Businesspeople focus on "the bottom line"-i.e., financial profit-and always act out of narrow selfinterest; (3) Political and social activists do not act out of self-interest because they are dedicated to helping others and changing the
world; (4) Therefore, whatever Helpline's governance structure
might have looked like, it tells us nothing about what governance
structures are appropriate for "real businesspeople."9 3
This argument, however, is flawed. First, it assumes its conclusion. It assumes that a businessperson is a person who acts simply
out of narrow self-interest, while the activist acts simply from other
motivations. There is, however, no empirical support for the proposition that businesspeople always act to further their own narrow
self-interest. What little empirical data do exist, moreover, suggests
to the contrary that businesspeople's motivation is quite compliId.
There are studies showing differences between the behavior of nonprofit and forprofit enterprises, but these studies do not detail differences in the decisionmaking
processes of nonprofit and for-profit ventures. See M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover
of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1035, 1095-96 (1992).
92
93
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cated.9 4 Nor is there empirical data to support the proposition that
political and social activists are utterly unconcerned with their own
narrow self-interest. Indeed, the attempt to draw this sharp distinction between businesspeople and social activists assumes that a person must be either a self-interested profit maximizer or a selfless
altruist. As I stated at the outset of this Article, that assumption
raises a false dichotomy, and I reject it here.9 5
Helpline's members ran their organization in a highly competent, businesslike way, and they did so very successfully. They provided services. They generated revenues, albeit primarily from
grants and donations rather than from fees.9 6 They expanded
from a two-person operation in 1968 to an organization of 41 fulltime salaried voting members and over one hundred volunteers in
1973.17 To be sure, the voting membership was strongly committed to maintaining equality among themselves.9" That egalitarian
approach, however, is hardly unbusinesslike. To the contrary, egalitarianism is one of the foundations of the Uniform Partnership
Act's default rules.9 9 Indeed, Helpline's decisionmaking processes
are eminently relevant to corporate lawyers and corporate law
scholars precisely because of the similarity between Helpline's governance structure and that of the UPA. The story of Helpline provides something that we in the legal profession rarely get to see: a
portrait of an organization engaged in raising revenues and providing services, at a time when it is not in crisis, when lawyers have not
been called in on a matter in dispute, when litigation is not being
contemplated.' 0 0 This allows us to examine how the governance
94 See GORDON DONALDSON & JAY W. LORSCH, DECISION MAKING AT THE Top: THE
SHAPING OF STRATEGIC DIRECTION (1983).

95 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (pointing out the false dichotomy
between altruistic self sacrifice and self interest).
96 Helpline did perform some fee-generating services, such as accepting foster
children in the shelter for runaways, for which the state paid a fee per child. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 150.
97 Apparently, because of a very high rate of turnovers, Helpline would see several
hundred volunteers over the course of a year. See id. at 141-42. Moreover, at any one
time there were over one hundred volunteers. Id. at 147.
98 Eighty-nine percent of Helpline's salaried, voting members reported that they
considered "'equality of power in internal decisions'" to be very crucial or fairly crucial to making Helpline what they wanted it to be. Id. at 146.
99 See infra notes 190-197 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities existing between Helpline's governance rules and the UPA).
100 It may well be that lawyers tend to think of business enterprises as essentially
adversarial because often we are not called in until the participants' interests sharply
conflict, and the participants cannot resolve the conflict themselves through negotiation. At that point, of course, the participants' relationship is decidedly adversarial, as
I am using that term (see supra note 9 and accompanying text). Thus, we do not
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structure of an egalitarian, collegial enterprise-a unitary enterprise-actually operated in practice.
Mansbridge characterizes Helpline as a "participatory workplace."10 ' As a technical matter of law, however, it was organized as
a not-for-profit corporation. 10 2 To preserve Helpline's anonymity,
Mansbridge did not divulge the state of its incorporation, so we
cannot be certain what governance rules applied to the entity by
statute. Most not-for-profit corporation statutes, however, have
similar governance rules that apply unless otherwise provided in
the entity's charter or bylaws."0 ' Assuming Helpline was formed
under a typical statute, its governance structure would have entailed the following default rule: Management would be conducted
"by or under the direction of' a board of directors. 10 4 In turn, the
voting members would elect a board annually. 0 5 Board action
would be valid if approved by a simple majority of directors present
at a meeting at which a quorum was in attendance, 10 6 with a quorum generally defined as a majority of all directors. 107 Voting
members would be entitled to approve certain fundamental
usually see the business enterprise operating tolerably smoothly, without unmanageable conflict-which is, of course, the usual and ordinary state of affairs in business
enterprises.
101 MANSBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 137.
102 Id. at 142.
103 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-9110 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NOTFoR-PROFIT CORP. LAw §§ 101-1515 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. CrV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1396 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993); REvISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
Acr (ABA 1987) [hereinafter RMNCA]. For a general overview of nonprofit corporations, see HowARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND As-

SOCIATIONS (5th ed. 1988).
104 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5210 (Deering 1979); N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROrr CORP. LAw
§ 701(a) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1993); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.14(A)
(West 1980); RMNCA § 8.01(b).
105 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5220(a), 5512(a), 5520 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993);
N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFrr CORP. LAw §§ 613(a), 703(a)-(b) (McKinney 1970 & Supp.
1993); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1396-2.13(C), 1396-2.15(B) (West 1980 & Supp.
1993); RMNCA § 8.04(a).
106 E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 5211(a) (8) (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NOTFoR-PRoFRT CORP. LAw § 708(d) (McKinney Supp. 1993); TEX. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1396-2.17(C) (West 1980); RMNCA § 8.24(b). Most states also recognize a director's "attendance" at a meeting by teleconference, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5211 (a) (6)
(Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NoT-FoR-PRoFIT CORP. LAw § 708(c) (McKinney
1993), and permit directors to act by unanimous written consent, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 5211(b) (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. LAw
§ 708(b) (McKinney 1993); RMNCA § 8.21(a).
107 CAL. CORP. CODE § 5211(a)(7) (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NoT-FoRPROFrT CORP. LAw § 707 (McKinney Supp. 1993); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 13962.17(A)(1) (West 1980); RMNCA § 8.24(a)-(b).
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t
changes if and when proposed by the Board, such as merger, 10
sale of all assets," 9 or dissolution and liquidation."' Voting members would elect directors by plurality vote,1 1 ' and would approve
fundamental changes by either an absolute majority or a two-thirds
majority vote. 1 2 Voting members would be permitted to vote by
proxy;"' directors would have to be present at a board meeting to
14
cast a vote."

Helpline eschewed the foregoing governance rules, and indeed its members seem to have been only dimly aware of what they
required." 5 The organization did not use a board of directors,
16
vesting management instead in its 41 salaried staff members."
Over the years, through a process of trial and error, the Helpline
staff developed its own internal governance rules. 1 7 Two aspects
of those rules are most significant for present purposes. First, most
decisions at Helpline were not made in face-to-face meetings of the
108 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 6012 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NoT-FoR§ 903(a) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1396-5.03(A) (1) (West 1980); RMNCA § 11.03(a) (2).
109 E.g., N.Y. NoT-FoR-PRom CoiP. LAw § 510(a) (1) (McKinney 1970 & Supp.
1993); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-5.09(A)(1) (West 1980); RMNCA
§ 12.02(b) (2).
110 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 6610(a) (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NoT-FoRPROFIT CORP. LAw § 1002(a) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1993); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1396-6.01(A) (1) (West 1980); RMNCA § 14.02(a) (2).
111 E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 5616(d) (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NoT-FoRPROFIT CORP. LAw § 613(a) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1993); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1396-2.13(c) (West 1980).
112 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5033, 5034 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993) (majority
vote required); N.Y. NoT-FoR-PRORT CoRP. LAw § 613(b), (c) (McKinney 1970 &
Supp. 1993) (two-thirds vote required); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN arts. 1396-4.02, 5.03, -5.09, -6.01 (West 1980) (two-thirds vote required); RMNCA §§ 10.03, 11.03,
12.02, 14.02 (two-thirds of votes cast or majority of voting power required, whichever
is less).
113 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5512(a), 5514 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. NOTFoR-PROFIT CORP. LAw § 609(a) (McKinney 1970); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
1396-2.13(B) (West 1980); RMNCA § 7.24(a).
114 CAL. CORP. CODE § 5211(a)(8) (Deering Supp. 1993); N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFIT
CORP. LAw § 708(d) (McKinney Supp. 1993); RMNCA § 8.24(b). But see Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1396-2.17(C) (West 1980) (directors may vote by proxy but those
voting by proxy are not counted toward a quorum).
115 See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 142-47. The Helpline members had some sense
of the statutory requirement that their corporation be managed by a board of directors, and accordingly designated the members of their long-range planning committee as the board of directors. Id. at 143. The long-range planning committee,
however, functioned differently from the way a board ordinarily functions, and was,
moreover, subject to close oversight by the entire membership. See infra notes 126-29
and accompanying text.
116 MANSBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 144.
117 Id. at 146-47.
PROFIT CORP. LAw
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entire membership. Such meetings were held only every few
months. 1 8 Second, although consensus was the formal rule of decision, consensus was an extremely flexible concept in practice at
Helpline. 9
In addition to an administrative division, Helpline consisted of
five distinct, operating service centers: a resource bureau for communes, a farm, a crisis telephone hotline, a temporary shelter for
runaways, and a 24-hour emergency van staffed by paramedics and
counselors. 120 Everyday decisions were decentralized to these respective service groups, each of which formally adhered to a rule of
consensus. 21 Not all of them followed the formal rule, however.
In general, the service, groups whose members worked closely together every day were more likely to achieve consensus than the
groups whose members did not interact daily.' 2 2 The shelter for
runaways, for example, was staffed by a close-knit, cohesive group.
In addition, its members firmly believed that they needed to maintain a united front in order to provide effective counseling to their
troubled adolescent clientele. As a result, the members of that
group worked hard to achieve real consensus, and they usually succeeded.123 The staff on the 24-hour emergency van, by contrast,
were not as close-knit as those at the shelter, and the functioning of
the van did not require the same degree of unity. As a result, the
van's staffers had fewer common interests and found it more difficult to generate common interests through empathy or identification with the group. Under those circumstances, had they insisted
on continuing to try to reach consensus they probably would have
become increasingly frustrated and disillusioned. That did not
happen, however. Instead, the van's staff ultimately unanimously
agreed to make decisions by a modified form of majority rule,
which they called "second-order consensus."' 24 Under this rule, a
proposal could be adopted on a two-thirds majority vote, but only
after those opposed were given a fair opportunity, over a period of
weeks, to express their concerns and try to change the others'
minds. 1 25 This use of a "second-order consensus" rule demonstrates the importance of the unitary group's ability to approach its
118 Id. at 144.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
124 Id. at
125 Id. at
119
120
121
122
123

164.
141.
144.
175.
177.
175.
176-77.
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governance rules flexibly, with an overarching goal of maintaining
cohesiveness among the participants. By not insisting on consensus, the van's staff overcame their recurrent impasses. At the same
time, they preserved one of the crucial aspects of decisionmaking
by consensus, namely, that everyone in the group gives careful consideration to all opinions before making a final decision.
Broader policy decisions at Helpline were made by a combination of electoral representation and communitywide consensus.
Helpline had two policy committees, one for long-range planning
26
and the other for personnel matters and short-term planning.
Both committees consisted of representatives from the administrative group and the service groups, and both met weekly.1 27 In setting policy, however, neither committee acted as a closed,
autonomous unit. Any member of the Helpline staff was entitled
to participate in committee deliberations. Moreover, in each committee, when issues arose on which any member believed that a
general consensus did not exist, committee members suspended
the issue to caucus with their respective service groups. The com128
mittee would then reconvene to work out a policy by consensus.
Any Helpline member could short circuit this process, however, by
calling for a general meeting of the membership to discuss and
1 29
decide the issue.
Two examples of major policy decisions illustrate how this internal governance structure worked. The first involved Helpline's
rejection of a lucrative contract offer made by a nearby Air Force
base. That decision was made at the level of the long-range planning committee. The second involved major cutbacks necessitated
by shrinking revenues. The cutbacks were worked out at a general
meeting of the entire membership.
Under the proposed Air Force contract, Helpline's crisis line
would have provided training to Air Force personnel, to beef up
the base's own crisis line.1 3 ' The Helpline members were initially
divided over this prdposal. Those who favored it viewed it as a generous offer furthering the organization's mission to help people in
need.13 1 Moreover, they viewed the naysayers, who were balking at
contracting directly with the military, as merely exhibiting
126
127

Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.

Id.
129 Id.
128

130
131

Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 179.
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"Pavlovian radicalism."" 2 The issue was settled in a meeting of the
long-range planning committee, after a week during which the
committee members sounded out their respective service
groups. 133 At the outset of the meeting there was strong sentiment
on both sides of the issue.'1 4 By the end, a consensus had formed
1 35
to reject the contract.
What is perhaps most interesting about this decision is that
even those who had originally supported the contract came away
from the meeting declaring themselves highly satisfied with both
the process and the outcome, notwithstanding the emotional and
sometimes angry tone of the discussion.' 36 For most, the stated
reason for their change of heart was their concern for the integrity
of Helpline's own crisis hotline. During the training project,
Helpline would not have been able to guarantee confidentiality to
its callers, nor could it have controlled the Air Force's use of information gathered from their callers.' 37 Some were also uncomfortable that the Air Force base in question was not merely a part of the
military, but was also a major supplier of personnel and material
for the war in Vietnam.1 38 In addition, however, the contract's proponents were clearly swayed by their own empathic response to the
intensity of their opponents' feelings.'3 9 In the end, the members
of the group came to a resolution that was "good for everyone" 40
because they were able to empathize, because they made the good
of the group their own, and because they were willing to engage in
the sometimes difficult process of talking a problem through to
14
consensus. 1
In contrast to the Air Force contract decision, the Helpline
members did not reach a satisfying consensus on how to respond
to a drastic falloff in revenues. The organization's total budget
needed to be cut by one-third. 4 2 Not surprisingly, each service
group wanted to spare its own budget but saw no need to spare the
others'. 4 3 Standing alone, that feeling might not have stood in the
Id.

132
133
134
135
136

Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.

137

Id.

Id.
Id.
140 Id. at 25, 180.
141 Id. at 182.
142 Id. at 149.
143 The shelter for runaways, for example, devised the equivalent of a one-third cut
138

139
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way of consensus because the members also believed that cutting
each group back by one-third was the logical and fair approach.'"
A sharper conflict, fueled by ideology, however, surfaced during
the budget crunch. This conflict pitted the majority of the staff
against the service group that provided counseling and other support to communes, and whose mission was to promote a New Left
political agenda. 145 Many of the rest of the staff, whose service
groups existed to serve the needy, viewed the commune support
group as "providing luxuries to middle-class people who were
neither in desperate need of services nor too poor to pay for
them."1 46 Their simmering resentment boiled over when the commune support group proposed to cut its budget by one-fourth in147
stead of a full third.
The long-range planning committee did not respond to this
conflict by instituting adversarial rules of decision. Instead, its
members worked out a complicated procedure aimed at achieving
consensus while also airing the conflict. 1 48 They called for a daylong meeting of the membership, divided into three segments. In
the first segment, the budget plan for each service group was announced to the entire membership, and then critiqued in groups
of seven to twelve. In the second segment of the meeting, the service groups caucused. In the third segment, the entire membership met for the final decision. 149 This procedure did meet the
immediate goals of the committee. By the end of the day, unanimous consent was reached on the budgets of all the groups except
the commune support group, and it was unanimously agreed that
that group would resubmit a budget, with cuts totalling a full
third. 5 ° In addition, inter-group criticisms were aired, but mostly
in the small group discussions. The general meeting was therefore
"relatively subdued." 5 ' Nonetheless, the criticisms that were
by combining layoffs with an increase in its revenues (which it accomplished by taking
in more state-paid foster children). Even so, the shelter's staffers believed it was being
cut "below the bone." Id. at 150. Similarly, the emergency van's staff initially decided
not to cut a full third, and the administrative division was "noncommittal" about its
cuts. Id. at 150, 155. Each of these groups was extremely critical of the commune
support group's desire not to be cut by a full third.
144 Id. at 149-50. There is no suggestion that the across-the-board approach to cutting the budget was seriously disputed.
145 Id. at 150.
146

Id.

147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.

at 150-51.

150 Id. at 156.
151 Id.
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voiced, especially those at the general meeting, stung deeply. Most
of the members left the meeting feeling emotionally drained and
1 52
even physically ill.
This budget-cutting process vividly demonstrates the difficulty
of putting theory into practice. In keeping with Mansbridge's theory, the Helpline members should have kept the consensus rule
only as long as interests were held in common. A major conflict
among the service groups had clearly surfaced. In theory, the
Helpline staff should have switched to an adversarial decisionmaking process at that point. The committee's approach, however,
aimed at achieving consensus, seems to have been best for the organization's long-term cohesiveness. That is because the conflict
that had erupted went far deeper than a struggle over tight finances. It went to the heart of the entity's very existence. There
were really two issues at stake: how to cut the overall budget, and
whether the commune support group should be completely jettisoned from the organization. 5 3 Adversarial procedures cannot
be effective unless the factions recognize each other's right to exist154 -and it was precisely that, the commune support group's
right to exist, that the other groups were questioning. Accordingly,
it may be that Helpline's membership was right not to approach
this particular conflict with exclusively adversarial procedures. The
controlled venting of grievances, and the insistence on reaching
consensus ultimately resulted in the reaffirmation of each service
group's right to remain part of the organization. Even though the
meeting itself was uncomfortable, therefore, it appears to have reestablished the group's sense of unity. That very conclusion, however, shows what a delicate task it is to determine, in any particular
case, whether a conflict is such that an "adversarial" decisionmaking mode would be preferable to a "unitary" one.
C.

The Unitary Enterprise: Its Defining Features, Its CentralProblem,
and the Chief Strategy for Addressing the Central Problem

Analogizing from the concept of the unitary democracy, the
defining features of the unitary enterprise may be said to be commonality of interests, equality of respect, consensus, and face-toface contact. The central challenge facing such an enterprise is
the risk that the relationship among its participants will break
down-more specifically, it is the risk that the organization will be152
153
154

Id. at 157.
Id. at 156.
Id.
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gin to lose one or more of these four essential qualities. The loss of
one, moreover, may lead to the unraveling of the entire fabric of
the enterprise. Thus, for example, the participants may come to
feel that their interests have begun to conflict more than they converge and they will not be able to reach consensus on issues. This
makes meetings stressful, so participants stay away from them and
as they communicate less and less, they lose their fundamental respect for one another. This makes it even more difficult to discover any interests held in common, and the participants become
more alienated and more frustrated. In this manner the organization spirals toward failure.
The chief strategy for preventing such a relational breakdown
is the general principle that the organization should make decisions by consensus, at face-to-face meetings. Under normal conditions, the combination of consensus and direct communication
sets in motion the cyclical dynamic of strong collegial relations
within the small enterprise. Through their engagement in the process of talking and listening to each other, the enterprise's participants reaffirm their basic respect for each other. They are
enabled, thereby, to empathize with each other and to take a direct
interest in the good of the firm. In turn, when they see it as in
their interests to promote each other's welfare, they can reach
common ground and decide on a course of action by consensus.
Reaching consensus enhances their sense of solidarity and their regard for each other, which sets the stage for reaching consensus on
the next issue. In this manner, the enterprise constantly generates
sustainable relations among its members.
It is important to recognize, however, that reaching consensus
in face-to-face meetings is not an end in itself. It is, rather, merely
a procedural means of maintaining the mutual respect and commonality of interests that are essential to the small firm's well-being. For a number of reasons, rigidly insisting upon reaching
consensus on every issue would be unwise. First, the consensus
rule entails costs which, at some point, may outweigh its benefits.
The most obvious cost of the rule it that it is very time-consuming.
The staffers at Helpline, for example, spent an average of seven
hours per week in decisionmaking meetings. 151 In addition, like
any procedural rule the consensus rule is subject to manipulation-as when, for example, a proposal is raised at the end of a
meeting so that it will receive only cursory attention and will be
155 Id. at 144.
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hurriedly approved. 156 Moreover, when a decision commands only
a weak consensus initially, the group may find itself revisiting the
issue over and over again, putting an obvious drag on the efficiency
157
of the firm's operations.
In addition, requiring unanimity even when interests conflict
would represent an ill-advised attempt to have one procedure serve
two distinctive needs of the unitary enterprise. On one hand, the
consensus rule would be expected to serve as a means for bringing
the participants together in a collegial search for the "right" policy.
On the other hand, it would also be expected to provide each participant with a self-protective veto-a shield to be erected against
her colleagues when her interests diverge from theirs. This use of
the consensus rule is ill-advised for several reasons. First, when interests conflict, there are other, more effective procedures for arriving at an acceptable resolution. The unanimous consent
requirement is not a good way to resolve conflict because it only
maintains the status quo. This results either in an arbitrary advantage for the faction that happens to prefer the status quo, or, if no
one prefers the status quo, in leaving everyone dissatisfied. Second, once the consensus rule is used adversarially, as a self-protective veto, it is difficult for the participants to turn around and use
the same procedure to find common ground. Finally, when interests conflict, insisting on consensus may lead the majority to use
coercive tactics to force the minority to go along, which may ultimately undermine the participants' essential respect for one another and lead to a breakdown in their relations.
To be sure, under ordinary circumstances the consensus rule's
benefit of continually renewing a sense of solidarity and purpose
within the firm amply outweighs its inherent limitations. When the
benefit is not forthcoming, however, or when the costs threaten to
become overwhelming, the consensus rule should be reexamined
and modified. It is not the consensus rule in itself that matters
most in the small firm. What matters most, rather, is the ultimate
goal of maintaining fundamental respect and commonality of
interests.
The challenge for the unitary enterprise, therefore, is to use
the procedural rules of consensus and face-to-face meetings as flexible tools to maintain collegiality. That challenge should not be
taken lightly. Inertia alone can lead enterprisers to rely on the
consensus rule even when it is neither beneficial nor cost-effective.
156
157

Id. at 166.
Id. at 166-67.
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Moreover, unitary groups tend to resist admitting the possibility
that their interests might conflict. As Mansbridge wrote: 'Just like
couples who feel they must act on every issue as if they were one,
consensual groups often find themselves unable to shift to adversary techniques when their members' interests begin to conflict.'15 8
Finally, because it can be stressful to acknowledge the existence of
conflict, the firm's members will be strongly tempted to suppress it,
even when they know, intellectually, that doing so undermines
their ability to get along.15 9
Making appropriate use of the consensus rule, thus, requires a
sustained effort. The enterprise's participants must be alert to the
rule's costs and limitations. They must be sufficiently open with
each other, and honest with themselves, to acknowledge the existence of conflict when it arises. And they must be willing to shiftoften experimentally-from the consensus rule to a modified consensus rule (such as, for example, the "second-order consensus"
used at Helpline),16° to an outright adversarial procedure, and
back again, when confronting different issues.
III.

A.

STATUTORY REGIMES FOR SMALL

BusiNEss ENTERPRISES

The Variegated OrganizationalForms

The hallmark of the law governing small business enterprises
is flexibility.1 6 ' The small firm may be organized as a partnership,
a limited partnership, a corporation, a statutory close corporation,
or a limited liability company. 1 62 Moreover, the statutes creating
these organizational forms are largely enabling. As a result, no
158 Id. at 33.
159 Indeed, the staffers at Helpline, notwithstanding their formal training in counseling and interpersonal communication, still tended to avoid conflict and confrontation. Id. at 160-62.
160 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text for a discussion on the "secondorder consensus rule."
161 Flexibility has long been said to be one of the pressing needs of the small business enterprise. See, e.g., F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
CORPORTIONS § 1.13 (3d ed. 1992); EdwinJ. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145 (1966); Willburt
D. Ham, Suggestionsfor Modernizingthe Kentucky General CorporationLaw to Meet the Needs
of Close Corporations,52 Ky. L.J. 527 (1964); Hillman, supra note 1, at 62; Oppenhein,
The Close Corporationin California: Necessity of Separate Treatment, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 227
(1961); Leonard S. Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms Versus Needs, 11 U.
FLA. L. REv. 433, 473 (1958).
162 See, e.g., ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 1-10 (1987);
CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusiNESS ASSOCIATIONS 57-63 (1992); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BuSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 6-10 (2d
ed. 1990).
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matter which form the small enterprise chooses, it may create its
163
own set of governance rules narrowly tailored to fit its needs.
For example, it may be organized as a partnership but adopt corporate-style governance rules, with management vested in an Executive Committee that acts by majority vote and is elected annually by
the partners.164 Conversely, it may be organized as a corporation
but have governance rules that make it look and act more like a
partnership.' 65
There is a certain irony in providing such a wide array of organizational forms to participants in small business enterprises. They
are the very sort of businesspeople who can least afford the time or
legal fees necessary to become sufficiently informed (a) to choose
intelligently from among the available organizational forms and
(b) to tailor the chosen form to fit their needs.' 6 6 The choice that
confronts them is made all the more difficult because each organizational form determines not only the enterprise's internal govern163

See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Private OrderingWithin Partnerships,41 U. Mi~Ai L.

REv. 425 (1987); Hillman, supra note 1, at 61-75.

164 UPA 1914 § 18; UPA 1992 §§ 301(a); 401(f). See, e.g., McCallum v. Asbury, 393
P.2d 774 (Or. 1964).

165 Some corporation statutes now permit statutory close corporations to do away
with the board of directors altogether, leaving shareholders to manage the corporation. E.g., DEL. GEN. CoRP. L. § 351. Some statutes reverse common-law decisions
that voided, on public policy grounds, shareholder agreements that "tie the hands" of
the board of directors. E.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 350; CAL. CoRP. CODE § 300 (West
1990); RMBCA § 7.32. Notwithstanding these latter statutes, it remains unclear
whether courts have quite relinquished their conviction that directors, not shareholders, should manage corporations. See, e.g., Zion v. Kurtz, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. 1980)
(43 decision with a strong dissent) (holding that Delaware would liberally allow the
shareholders of corporations that qualified to become statutory close corporations to
enter into agreements tying the hands of the board of directors). See generally Hillman, supra note 1, at 61-75.
166 By contrast, the organizers of a large business need not pause long over their
choice of organizational form. If they want professional management, broad managerial prerogatives, and specialization of residual risk-bearing (to diversified owners),

they will adopt the corporate form. See generally EASTERBROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 4,
at 1-39. The costs of tailoring the corporate form to the particular business's needs,
moreover, will generally be trivial in comparison with its assets and sales. See Bernard
S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv.
542, 555-59 (1990).
It can be argued that a variety of organizational forms ought to be made available
so that various types of small businesses will have the benefit of choosing from "off the
rack" sets of default rules, that would not have to be altered by contract. But if that
were, in fact, the object of the proliferation of small business forms, there would have
to be a great deal many more organizational forms than exist today. To provide a
complete array of off-the-rack sets of default rules, there would have to be an organizational form for each possible combination of the most important rules, namely: (1) the
right to engage in management; (2) the right to dissolve and liquidate the firm; (3)
limitation of liability; and (4) income tax treatment.
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ance rules, but also the owners' personal liability for enterprise
debts, and the federal income tax treatment that the enterprise will
receive. Thus, for example, partners are personally liable for the
debts of the partnership, 1" 7 while members of limited liability companies"~ and shareholders of both ordinary corporations and statutory close corporations 69 are shielded from such liability.
Corporations (whether ordinary or closely-held) are taxed as entities separate from their owners, 7 ° while general171 and limited
partnerships, 1 72 as well as most limited liability companies, 173 re-

ceive "flow-through" tax treatment, meaning that the owners of
such entities are taxed on their proportional share of the entities'
earnings.
This statutory complexity obviously makes the choice complicated. More importantly, however, it increases the risk that small
business owners will find themselves bound by internal governance
rules that are wrong for them because they chose an organizational
form based on liability and tax considerations. At the formation
stage of a small business, it may often seem to the organizers that
liability and taxes are the only important considerations. Governance rules may seem to be just so much "lawyers' boilerplate" because the organizers know that their relationship, now unified and
cooperative, will stay that way. Such myopia on the part of the businesspeople forming the venture is understandable. They are not
"repeat players" at organizing a business-unlike their lawyers, who
UPA 1914 § 15; UPA 1992 § 306.
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.436 (West 1992); TEX. CODE ANN. art. 1528n art. 4.03
(Vernon 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1977); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft Limited Liability Act § 304 [hereinafter Uniform
LLC Law].
167
168

169 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.22(b) (1985 & Supp. 1991). See ROBERT C.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.1 (1986). For a critique of limited liability for close

corporations, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close CorporationsReconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REv.
1143 (1989).
170 A corporation is normally treated as a tax entity separate from its shareholders,
EDWIN T. HooD & JOHN J. MYLAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.13
(1993), although this rule is subject to exceptions. See, e.g., Bollinger v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 340 (1988) (declaring that the IRS may disregard a corporation's
separate identity for tax purposes if it is in fact only an "agent" for the shareholders).
171 HOOD & MYrtAN, supra note 170, §§ 1.01, 1.03; 9 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCoME TAX § 35.01 (1990).
172 ROBERT J. HAFr & PETER M. FASS, 4A INVESTMENT IN LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
§ 4A.01 [1] (1989).
173 See, e.g., Thomas E. Geu, Understandingthe Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (PartOne), 37 S.D. L. REv. 44, 45 (1992) [hereinafter Geu, LLC's Part
One]; WILLIAM D. BAGLEY & PHILIP P. WHYNOTr, THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY- THE
BETTER ALTERNATIE 1.500 (1991).
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can be expected to have extensive repeat experience in both the

formation and the breakup of enterprises.
It is not just businesspeople, however, but also the drafters of
business enterprise statutes, who devote most of their attention to
questions of liability and taxes, to the exclusion of internal governance rules. A case in point is the limited liability company. Limited liability companies have long existed in Europe 1 74 and Latin
America, 175 but they are new to the United States.1 7 6 In this coun-

try, they were conceived as a means by which small businesses
might enjoy both corporation-like limited liability and partnershiplike tax treatment. 77 A perusal of limited liability company stat-

utes, however, reveals that the statutes' drafters gave very little
thought to the internal governance of such entities. In seven
states, the limited liability company statutes contain no decisionmaking rule at all-the entity's founders are simply directed to
In Germany, for example, the GmbH in its present form has existed since the
late 19th Century. Law Concerning Companies with Limited Liability of April 20,
1892 (Reichsgesetzblatt 477) in the wording of the publication of May 20, 1898
(Reichsgesetzblatt 1846), last amended by Law ofJuly 4, 1980 (Federal Gazette, Part I,
p. 836). See generally RUDOLF MUELLER ET AL, THE GEsuAN GMBH-LAw (1981).
175 See, e.g., Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (General Law of Business Entities),
D.O., Aug. 4, 1934, as amended Aug. 28, 1934 ch. V.
176 In 1977, Wyoming adopted the first modern limited liability company statute in
the United States. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15 (1977). Other states did not immediately follow suit because in 1979 the IRS proposed to rule that limited liability companies
formed under the Wyoming statute would be taxed as corporations-apparently because of their limited liability feature. See BAGLEY & WHYNo- r, supra note 173, at
§ 1.503-04. Curiously, however, the day after this ruling, the IRS issued a private letter
ruling agreeing to treat a particular Wyoming limited liability company as a partnership for tax purposes. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06082 (Nov. 18, 1980). See BAGLEY & WHYNo-rr, supra note 173, at § 1.503-04. Nonetheless, Florida enacted a limited liability
company statute in 1982. Then, in 1988, the IRS reversed its position and ruled that
the tax treatment of limited liability companies would be determined case by case,
according to the four-factor test of Kintner v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1954). Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344 (1935); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701. Since then, 26 states have adopted limited liability company statutes, and all of the remaining states have such legislation under
consideration.
For comprehensive considerations of limited liability companies, see BAGLEY &
WHYNoTr, supra note 173; Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. REs. L. Rxv. 387 (1991); Thomas E. Geu, Understandingthe
Limited Liability Company: A Basic ComparativePrimer (Part Two), 37 S.D. L. REv. 467
(1992) [hereinafter Geu, LLC's Part Two]; Geu, LLC's Part One, supra note 173; Susan
Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choicefor Doing Business, 41 FLA.
L. Rxv. 721 (1989); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of
the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375 (1992).
177 Geu, LLC's Part One, supra note 173, at 45; BAGLEY & WHsNorr, supra note 173,
at 1.500.
174
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provide for such matters in their organizing documents. 178 In most
other states the statutes contain a curious coupling of the partnership norm that the firm is managed by its owners with the corporate norm that decisions are made by majority vote.1 79 Legislative
histories are devoid of any explanation for this hybrid provision,
and the commentary on limited liability company statutes is similarly quiet about it. In fact, like the limited liability company statutes themselves, commentary on them has focused on their tax and
liability aspects, giving only cursory treatment to their internal gov0
8
ernance rules.1

Other vehicles are similarly designed to serve the liability and
tax preferences of small business enterprises. Thus, the limited
partnership is useful for investors who wish to remain passive, to
8
have limited liability, and to receive flow-through tax treatment.1 '
The statutory close corporation and, increasingly, the ordinary corporation are useful for owner-managers of small enterprises who
want limited liability; such individuals, moreover, may choose
either to be taxed as a corporation or to receive flow-through tax
178 ALA. CODE § 10-12-1 (1975 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West
1992), amended by 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 93-284 (H.B. 1943) (West); KAI. STAT.
ANN. ch. 17, art. 76 (1992); NEv. REv. STAT. § 86.010 (Michie 1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 47:34 (1992); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 48:2b (1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116
(1977).
179 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-402 (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 180, para. 15-1
(1993); Uniform LLC Law, supra note 168, § 301(a) (1). But cf. TEX. REv. Crv. STAT.
art. 1528n. art. 2.12 (vesting management in elected managers rather than members;
managers act by majority vote).
180 The major tracts on limited liability companies devote very little space to the
questions of (1) who manages the entity, and (2) by what rule they make decisions.
Geu, LLC's Part One, supra note 173; BAGLEY & WHYNoTr, supra note 173.
The vast majority of commentary on limited liability companies, moreover, does
not even purport to treat their governance rules, instead focusing narrowly on the tax
aspects of such entities. See, e.g., Louis A. Mezzullo, Limited Liability Companies: A New
Business Form?, 21 TAX'N FOR LwY. 296 (1993); Ronald P. Platner, Limited Liability
Companies are Increasingly Popular,20 TAX'N FOR LAw. 225 (1992); EdwardJ. Roche, Jr.
et al., Limited Liability Companies Offer Pass Through Benefits Without S Corp. Restrictions,
74 J. TAx'N 248 (1991); Mark A Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1069 (1992); Keen L. Ellsworth, Comment, Utah Limited Liability

Companies: The "Ugly Ducklings," 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1091;Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey

R. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alternative to the
S Corporationand the Limited Partnership?,23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 523 (1988); Sylvester J. Orsi, Comment, The Limited Liability Company: An OrganizationalAlternative for
Small Business, 70 NEB. L. REv. 150 (1991); Matthew W. Ray, Comment, The Texas
Limited Liability Company: A Possible Alternativefor Business Formation, 46 SMU L. REv.
841 (1992); Joseph A. Rodriguez, Comment, Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Limited Liability and Taxation Concerns in OtherJurisdictions,27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 539
(1992).
181 4A HAFT & FAss, supra note 172, § 4A.01 [1], [2].
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treatment under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. 8 2
For no discernable reason, however, the rules of decision for such
entities differ. Decisions are made by consensus in the limited
partnership,8 3 but by majority vote in the ordinary corporation,8 4
even though the default rule for both such entities is that the limited partners and shareholders are passive investors who entrust
management to a team of professionals. 8 5 Moreover, decisions are
made by majority vote in the statutory close corporation, 18 6 even
though that vehicle is supposedly designed for the small, intimate
enterprise whose owners will for the most part be engaged in
87
management. 1
How, then, does the business lawyer lead her clients to choose
the internal governance structure that is right for them? The danger in trying to explain to them the importance of planning in
advance for future disputes is well known. Focusing on disputes
182 I.R.C. § 1361 (a) (2) (a C corporation is a corporation that has not elected Subchapter S status); HOOD & MYLAN, supra note 170, §§ 1.01, 1.03.
183 UNIF. LIM. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 586 (1916) [hereinafter ULPA];
REv. UNIF. Lim. PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 403, 1105, 6 U.L.A. 111, 485 (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter RULPA].
184 CAL. CORP. CODE § 307(a)(8) (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1993) (action by directors); CAL. CORP. CODE § 602(a) (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1993) (action by shareholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (action by directors); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (1991) (action by shareholders); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 708(d) (McKinney 1986) (action by directors); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 614(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993) (action by shareholders); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.
§ 8.24(c) (1985 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 2 MBCAA] (action by directors); 2 MBCAA § 7.25(c) (action by shareholders).
185 A limited partner may not participate in the control of the business of the limited partnership and still retain limited liability. ULPA § 7; RULPA § 303. Thus, limited partners entrust management of the business to the general partners. Similarly,
corporation statutes vest management exclusively in the board of directors, making
shareholders passive investors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (1991 & Supp.
1992); 2 MBCAA § 8.01(b).
186 CAL. CORP. CODE § 307(a) (8) (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1993) (because California
close corporations are essentially ordinary corporations with specific additional provisions included in the articles of incorporation, id. § 158(a), the voting requirements
for action by shareholders acting as directors is the same as the voting requirements
for action by directors of ordinary corporations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351(2)
(1991) (because the shareholders of close corporations are deemed to be directors,
id., the voting requirement is the same as for action by directors of ordinary corporations, id. § 141(b) (Supp. 1992)); MD. CORPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4-303(5) (1993);
MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. Supp. § 21(c)(2)(ii) (1985 & Supp. 1991), in 4
MBCAA.
187 CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1993) (shareholders of record may not exceed 35 in number); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a) (1) (1991) (shareholders of record may not exceed 30 in number); MD. CORPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN.
§ 4-201 (1993) (Maryland sets no limit on the number of shareholders of record for
close corporations); MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUnP. § 3(b) (1985 & Supp.
1991), in 4 MBCAA (shareholders of record may not exceed 50 in number).
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can "queer the deal," having just the opposite effect of what the
lawyer intended. 18 8 I offer a tentative suggestion here, building on
this Article's notion of the unitary-to-adversary spectrum of business enterprises. The lawyer should try to ascertain whether her
clients' relationship falls more toward the adversary end of the
spectrum (all sides deal with each other at arms' length, and each
side focuses on his own narrow self-interest, expecting the others to
do likewise), or more toward the unitary end (the clients' primary
impulse is to seek consensus, ask the others for their input, try to
discover what is in the firm's best interest, and what will be "good
for everyone"). Some types of ventures are best suited for an adversarial (in the sense of arms'-length) governance structure, while
others are best suited for a more unitary structure. It is probably
also true that some types of personalities are more comfortable
with an adversary structure, while other types would prefer a unitary structure. The business lawyer may do her clients a substantial
favor by getting them to agree at least on whether they prefer an
arms'-length or a unitary approach.
If the nascent venture falls on the unitary end of the spectrum,
it will, on the whole, be best served by the default governance rules
of the Uniform Partnership Act.' 8 9 That is because, unlike the
other forms of business organization, the partnership was not
designed for liability and tax purposes. Rather, it seems to have
been designed with the governance needs of the unitary enterprise
in mind. In the following section, I examine the governance rules
of partnership law, and demonstrate that these rules follow unitary
principles.
B.

PartnershipLaw and Unitary Principles

The decisionmaking processes used at Helpline, Inc. are especially intriguing for students of partnership law. This nonprofit
corporation ultimately evolved a governance structure that bears a
striking resemblance to the Uniform Partnership Act. At Helpline,
each of the salaried staff had an equal voice in the management of
the organization. 190 They also had equal base salaries.1 9 1 Their
188 John C. Coffe, Jr., The Mandatory Enabling Balance in CorporateLaw: An Essay on
the JudicialRole, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1677 (1989); Robert C. Thompson, Corporate
Dissolution and Shareholders' ReasonableExpectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 199, 324 (1988).
189 That does not necessarily mean a partnership must be formed. A corporation
or a limited liability company could be formed instead, with partnership governance
rules imported into those vehicles by contract. Some states, of course, will be more
amenable to such a strategy than others. See supranote 165 and accompanying text.
190 MANSBRmDGE, supra note 8, at 144-46.
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rule of decision distinguished between ordinary business matters
and other matters. Ordinary matters were decentralized to the respective service groups, some of which used a consensus rule while
others used majority vote. 192 For major decisions, consensus was
required, whether the decision was referred to the long range planning committee or to the entire membership.1 9 Each of these governance rules has a parallel in the UPA. Under the UPA, every
partner has the right to participate in management.1 9 4 Partners
are not entitled to a salary, but share equally in the profits of the
business. 19 5 Moreover, the UPA also distinguishes ordinary business matters from other matters. The former are decided by majority vote of the partners, while the latter require the partners'
unanimous consent.

196

These similarities between Helpline's governance rules and
those of the UPA are not coincidental. Rather, they reflect the fact
that the norms of egalitarianism and consensual decisionmaking
adopted by Helpline's membership are also the foundational
norms of partnership law. As one commentator has noted, the
"classic 'model' partnership contemplated by the UPA is a small,
intimate venture organized along egalitarian lines."' 9 7 Thus, partnership law contemplates an association characterized by the very
features that characterize the unitary democracy-equal respect
among the partners, commonality of interests, and decisionmaking
by consensus in face-to-face meetings.
1.

Equal respect among partners

While there is no express statutory requirement that partners
respect each other equally,'
the breakdown of such respect is a
ground for judicial dissolution of the partnership. Steckroth v. Ferguson' 99 contains perhaps the most eloquent statement of the need
for equal respect among partners. In that case, one partner's "per191 Id. at 146.
192

193
194
195
196

197
198

Id. at 144, 175.
Id. at 144.
UPA 1914 § 18(e); UPA 1992 § 401(f).
UPA 1914 § 18(a),(f); UPA 1992 § 401(b), (h).
UPA 1914 § 18(h); UPA 1992 § 401(j).

Hillman, supra note 1, at 432.
But cf.Robert W. Hillman, Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look at Participatory

Rights in the Management of GeneralPartnerships,1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 865, 888-91 (arguing that UPA § 18(e), which grants equal management rights to partners, gives legal
cognizance to partners' "dignity interests," a concept that includes the partners' interest in being respected by their co-partners, and in having their voices heard on significant partnership matters).
199 274 N.W. 792 (Mich. 1937).
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sistent attitude ... to become the dominating figure of the firm" 20 0
justified the court in dissolving the partnership. The court
expounded:
There must be equality of authority and prestige in a partnership, except as merit promotes. One partner cannot continually
minimize the other and bring him into disrepute or contempt
without destroying the basic status upon which a successful partnership rests. 211
In other, similar cases,judicial dissolution has been granted because a
partner "manifested an assumption of preeminence in the firm ";202 or
because a partner so excluded his colleague from management "that
203 In each of
the business existed solely for [his] use and benefit.
these cases, the aggrieved partners successfully invoked the provision
of the UPA that allows judicial dissolution when a partner "willfully or
persistently" either breaches the partnership agreement or acts in
such a way "that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him."20 4 In holding that a partner's exclusion, belittling, or domination of his colleagues triggers this provision,
the courts hold, in effect, that an association cannot be a "partnership" if its members cannot respect each other equally.
2.

Commonality of interests

Taken in the aggregate, the partnership law norms that partners share equally in both the profits and the losses of the firm,20 5
that each partner is personally liable for the debts of the firm,20 6
that any partner can incur debt on behalf of the firm, 20 7 and that
the departure of any partner dissolves the partnership, which triggers the right in every partner to liquidate the business, 2 8 evince
an underlying assumption that common interests predominate in
the partnership. The upshot of all these provisions is that each
partner is directly and personally affected by the actions of her colleagues, and each can directly and personally affect the others.
Businessmen and women do not enter into such arrangements unless they trust each other. The underlying assumption of partnerId. at 793.
Id. at 794.
Ferrick v. Barry, 68 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Mass. 1946).
Lau v. Wong, 616 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980).
UPA 1914 § 32(1)(d). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act has retained this
rule. UPA 1992 § 801(5) (ii).
205 UPA 1914 § 18(a); UPA 1992 § 401(b).
206 UPA 1914 § 15; UPA 1992 § 306.
207 UPA 1914 § 9(1); UPA 1992 § 301(1).
200
201
202
203
204

208

UPA 1914 §§ 31(1)(b), 37; UPA 1992 §§ 601(1), 804(a).
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ship law, thus, is that the relationship among partners is founded
on personal trust.2 0 9 In turn, the sort of trust that makes this kind
of arrangement possible arises because for the most part partners
share common interests.
Moreover, partnership law norms also evince an underlying assumption that the "interests" that partners share in common are
the broad-gauged, expansive interests discussed earlier in this Article.2 10 That is, partnership law assumes that partners act to promote or protect their interest in the welfare of their colleagues,
their interest in the welfare of the firm as a whole, and their interest in living up to their ideals, as well as their narrow self-interest.
Thus, partnership law, like Mansbridge's theory of unitary democracy, rejects the assumption that narrow self-interest, in itself, motivates each person. Two examples that illustrate this point are
partnership law's equal-sharing-of-profits rule,2 1 1 and its rule that
each partner has authority to bind the firm.2
The rule that partners share equally in profits is not compatible with the assumption that each partner is just a self-interested
profit-maximizer. Because the equal sharing rule vouchsafes to
each partner an equal share of the profits whether or not she works
as hard as her partners, the utterly selfish partner would thereby be
given a perverse incentive, that is, an incentive to shirk. If all partners are assumed to be utterly selfish, the equal sharing rule is irrational because all the partners would have a perverse incentive to
shirk, which would result in minimizing, rather than maximizing,
the profits available for sharing. Partnership law, however, is not
irrational. Rather, partnership law adheres to the equal sharing
rule because it presupposes that partners will work cooperatively
and in good faith to maximize profits for all. Stated in Mansbridge's terms, partnership law assumes that partners make each
other's good their own and that they make the good of the firm
itself their own. Partners whose "interests" include the welfare of
their colleagues and the welfare of their firm, as well as their own
welfare, will work cooperatively to maximize profits for all to share
equally.
For the same reasons, the rule that every partner has authority
to bind the firm would be irrational if all partners were assumed to
209 See, e.g., In re Harms, 10 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); Venier v. Forbes,
25 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 1946). See also Meinhard v.Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928).
210 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
211 UPA 1914 § 18(a); UPA 1992 § 401(b).
212 UPA 1914 § 9(1); UPA 1992 § 301(1).
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be exclusively devoted to promoting their own self-interest. Such a
rule would be irrational because it would create a perverse incentive. An utterly selfish partner, knowing that her colleagues would
share liability for any debt she incurred on behalf of the firm,
would have the perverse incentive to be careless about the debts
she took on for the firm. If all partners were selfishly careless in
this way, profits would be minimized rather than maximized. 1 3
Again, however, partnership law is not irrational. Rather, it makes
each partner an authorized agent of the firm because it presupposes that partners care not only for their own welfare but also for
the welfare of their colleagues and of the firm. Thus, because partners make the good of their colleagues and of the firm their own,
together they share a common interest in incurring debts in a prudent and responsible fashion.
3.

Decisionmaking by consensus

Under the Uniform Partnership Act, every out-of-the-ordinary
matter must be decided by unanimous consent, whether it implicates conflicting interests or common interests among the partners. This rule of decision differs significantly from the interestsbased decision rule advocated in Part II of this Article. Moreover,
as argued in Part II, requiring consensus without regard to whether
interests conflict or converge is inappropriate. It uses one procedure, the consensus rule, to serve the starkly contradistinctive pur213 Perhaps this is why the drafters of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act created
a new fiduciary duty of care for partners. UPA 1992 § 404. The language of this
provision makes it clear that it is a corporate-style duty of care that is contemplated.
CompareUPA 1992 § 404(d) ("A partner's duty of care ... is limited to refraining from
engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law") (emphasis added) with Del. Gen. Corp. Lit. § 102(b) (7) (allowing
corporations, by charter provision, to eliminate directors' personal liability for breach
of the duty of care, except "acts.. . which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law") (emphasis added).
Whatever the reason, inserting a corporate-style duty of care into the default
rules of the Uniform Partnership Act is misguided. Corporate directors' duty of care
is inextricably bound up with the business judgment rule; and the business judgment
rule, in turn, is simply a device to keep the management of the corporation in the
directors' hands and out of the shareholders' hands-shareholders being, after all,
passive investors. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). The corporate law
norm of duty-of-care/business-judgment-rule is appropriate for the impersonal, adversarial relationship between professional corporate managers and passive shareholders, who can be expected to deal with each other out of narrow self-interest. That
norm, however, simply does not fit with partnership's personal, egalitarian norms.
For a detailed critique of the Revised Act's presumption that partners are just selfish
profit-maximizers, see Alan W. Vestal, Fundamental ContractarianError in the Revised
Uniform PartnershipAct of 1992, 73 B.U. L. Rxv. 523 (1993).
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poses of bringing the partners together, and of protecting them
against each other. Nevertheless, putting aside this shortcoming of
the partnership consensus rule, the rule in no way signals a retreat
from the law's conception of the partnership as a unitary enterprise. To the contrary, the choice of consensus as the decisional
rule indicates an underlying assumption that partners are colleagues with mostly common interests, not adversaries with basically conflicting interests.
CONCLUSION

This Article is intended to be an initial attempt to develop a
way of understanding business enterprises that takes into account
the full gamut of firms, from publicly-traded corporations to
closely-held partnerships. Under my proposal, all business enterprises can be understood as falling along an adversary-to-unitary
spectrum, depending upon whether the owner/manager relationship is dominated by conflicting interests or by common interests.
Obviously, however, numerous possibilities and questions remain
to be explored.
First, I have suggested that when interests conflict in the unitary enterprise, its members should adopt "adversarial" decisionmaking procedures. What adversarial procedures, however, would
be appropriate? Majority vote may be a sensible adversarial procedure in the large, impersonal world of national politics, but in the
closely-held firm it has produced notoriously pernicious effects.214
Therefore, when interests conflict in the small firm, adversarial
bargaining might be preferable to majority vote. What should be
the ground rules of such bargaining? Should it resemble the structured settlements being tried in commercial litigation? Should the
factions arbitrate conflictual issues? Should the ultimate bargain
be required to be "Pareto superior" (meaning that it makes no one
worse off and improves the lot of at least one person or faction)?
More than likely, these questions would be best elucidated through
empirical study. The ways in which unitary firms actually resolve
issues when interests conflict would tell us much about which
mechanisms work, which do not work, and why.
Another question concerns exit from the unitary enterprise.
In advocating that unitary enterprises make decisions according to
whether interests conflict or converge, this Article has focused on
business decisions made in the course of operating the firm. What
214

See, e.g., Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 17; O'Neill, supra note 26.
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of a participant's decision to withdraw her capital and invest it elsewhere? The desire to cash out of the firm actually raises two issues:
whether the participant can withdraw her capital at all, and if so,
on what terms. Because these issues so clearly raise conflicting interests, it seems inappropriate for the firm's membership to decide
either of them by consensus. Should the members decide them
both by adversarial procedures? Perhaps each participant should
be able to decide unilaterally to withdraw, while all participants
would be involved in working out the terms of a withdrawal. If so,
what would be the ground rules for negotiating such terms? Here
again, empirical study would probably provide the best information about successful mechanisms for withdrawal and mechanisms
that turn out to be dysfunctional.
The introduction to this Article posits a lawyer whose smallbusiness clients ask for advice on governance rules, and who cannot manage anything better than the flaccid response that this is a
business decision which the clients must make for themselves. It is
true that the choice of governance rule is ultimately for each group
of enterprisers to make; but it remains the function of the law to
shape the frame of reference within which that choice is made. To
be workable, such a frame of reference ought to recognize both
the complexity of owners' and managers' interrelationship, and
the complexity of their individual motivations. In addition to understanding their self-interested, adversarial behavior, we should
also try to understand their supportive, collegial behavior. This
Article, it is hoped, has contributed to that effort.

